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Abstract 
 
 Nowadays governments show a growing interest on identifying the portion of 
the economic activity that is not observable or non-declared, either due to explicit tax 
evasion, to the illegal nature of the activities or just because production is devoted to 
auto consumption. Among other macroeconomic links, some literature refers that non-
observed economy and inequality tend to walk along the same path. In fact, countries 
that present high estimated levels of the non-observed sector (in terms of GDP 
percentage) exhibit, simultaneously, high inequality values; conversely, lower 
estimations for the non-observed sector characterize developed countries and these 
exhibit lower income inequalities. This link has already been studied in the literature. 
However, there is still no systematic review on the theoretical channels relating the size 
of the non-observed sector and inequality; moreover, there seems to be no consensus on 
the causality relation between the two dimensions. 
 This dissertation provides an exhaustive review on the main mechanisms 
relating, potentially with reverse causality, inequality and the size and nature of non-
observed economy, supported by both theoretical and empirical pieces of literature. 
Additionally, we provide an assessment of the causality relationship between non-
observed economy and income inequalities and categorize the results by developed and 
developing countries. Using Granger Causality tests, we found strong statistical support 
for the hypothesis of income inequalities causing non-observed economy, and only 
finding the reverse causal nexus statistically relevant in developed countries. Moreover, 
we also provide more detailed evidence by estimating the relationship between these 
two variables using Two-Stage Least Squares methodology. This method allowed us to 
conclude that co-movement is positive when income inequality determines non-
observed economy, whereas the relation is inverse (negative) when non-observed 
economy explains income inequality.  
 
JEL Classification: E25, E26, I32, J3, O17 
Keywords: Non-Observed Economy, Income Distribution, Underground Economy, 
Income Inequality 
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Resumo 
 
 Atualmente, assistimos a um crescente interesse por parte dos governos em 
identificar a parcela da atividade económica que não é observável ou não-declarada, que 
advém da evasão fiscal explícita, da natureza ilegal das atividades ou apenas da 
produção dedicada ao auto consumo. Entre outros impactos macroeconómicos, alguma 
literatura refere que a economia não observada e a desigualdade dos rendimentos 
tendem a caminhar no mesmo sentido. De facto, os países que apresentam elevados 
valores estimados para a atividade não-observada (em percentagem do PIB) exibem, 
simultaneamente, valores elevados de desigualdade; da mesma forma, as estimativas 
mais baixas do setor não-observado correspondem também a países que apresentam 
menor desigualdade na distribuição de rendimentos. Esta é uma relação que tem sido 
estudada na literatura. No entanto, ainda não existe uma revisão sistemática sobre os 
canais teóricos que explicam claramente os impactos recíprocos entre a economia não-
observada e a desigualdade; além disso, parece não haver consenso sobre a relação de 
causalidade entre as duas dimensões. 
 Esta dissertação apresenta uma revisão exaustiva sobre os principais 
mecanismos relacionados, potencialmente, com a causalidade entre a desigualdade e a 
dimensão da economia não observada, apoiada por partes teóricas e empíricas da 
literatura. Além disso, oferecemos uma avaliação da relação de causalidade entre a 
economia não-observada e desigualdade, categorizando os resultados por países 
desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento. Usando testes de Causalidade de Granger, 
encontramos apoio estatístico para a hipótese das desigualdades de rendimento 
causarem a economia não observada, apenas encontrando o nexo de causalidade 
inversa, estatisticamente relevante, para os países desenvolvidos. Oferecemos também 
evidência mais detalhada, através da metodologia Two-Stage Least Squares. Este 
método permitiu-nos concluir pelo co-movimento quando a desigualdade determina a 
economia não observada, enquanto a relação é inversa quando a economia não 
observada explica a desigualdade dos rendimentos. 
Classificação JEL: E25, E26, I32, J3, O17 
Palavras-Chave: Economia Não Observada, Distribuição dos Rendimentos, Economia 
Paralela, Desigualdade dos Rendimentos 
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1. Introduction 

Nowadays governments are showing interest on identifying the portion of the 
economic activity that is not observable or non-declared, either due to explicit tax 
evasion, to the illegal nature of the activities or just because production is devoted to 
auto consumption. Causes and macroeconomic consequences of the presence of a non-
observed sector are now widely explored in the literature. For example, a larger non-
observed economy represents larger potential losses in terms of fiscal revenues that 
affect negatively welfare by reducing resources devoted to provide widespread 
education and health, social assistance and quality institutions. The latest estimations 
for the size of the shadow economy around the world (see, e.g., Buehn and Schneider, 
2012a) indicate that, in 2007, the non-observed sector represented 19.4% of GDP for 
the world economy, as well as 28.3% and 14.6% for the developing and OECD 
countries, respectively. 
Among other macroeconomic links, some literature refers that non-observed 
economy and inequality tend to walk along the same path. In fact, countries that present 
high estimated levels of the non-observed sector (in terms of GDP percentage) exhibit, 
simultaneously, high inequality values; conversely, lower estimations for the non-
observed sector characterize developed countries and these exhibit lower income 
inequalities (cfr. Benjamin et al., 2014). This gives primary evidence to support a link 
between the size of the non-observed sector and income inequality.
This link has already been studied in the literature. However, there is still no 
systematic review on the theoretical channels relating the size of the non-observed 
sector and inequality; moreover, there seems to be no consensus on the causality 
relation between the two dimensions. It has already been established that income 
inequalities can increase the size of the non-observed economic activity (Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007): being part of the formal sector has a cost, for example in terms of 
income taxes, and it is possible to find no benefits from belonging to the formal sector 
for the poor in a cost-benefit perspective. Additionally, it has also been shown that the 
effects of taxes on inequality are ambiguous. On the one hand, tax revenues increase the 
quality of institutions that help to reduce poverty and income inequalities while, on the 
other hand, for a given tax rate, the poor are, in fact, more prone to escape from 
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formality, e.g., not to pay taxes and, therefore, become non-observed (Dessy and 
Pallage, 2003). Thus, it is not yet clear whether the effect of a tax hike on reducing 
inequality will directly reduce non-observed economy or if its effect on increasing the 
non-observed sector will overlap the latter and will worsen income inequality. 
Thereby, our research questions are: (i) what are the main mechanisms relating 
inequality and the size of non-observed economy?; (ii) what is the dominant causality 
relation – from inequality to non-observed economy or the other way around?; and 
finally (iii) what is the sign of the relationship: are these variables co-moving or are 
they inversely related?
The aim of this dissertation is to give an overall review on this subject, 
supported by both theoretical and empirical strands of the literature. Additionally, we 
intend to provide an assessment of the causality relation between non-observed 
economy and income inequality, using a set of developed and developing countries, and 
further detail the nature and magnitude of the link between these two variables.
The first two sections are devoted to the literature review. Accordingly, in 
chapter 2, (i) we define the concepts of non-observed economy and inequality and (ii) 
identify the main macroeconomic impacts relating to both. In chapter 3 we present the 
mechanisms through which (i) the size of the non-observed economy affects income 
inequality and (ii) those operating in the reverse order. Moreover, we provide a review 
on the main results of the empirical literature testing these mechanisms. In chapter 4 we 
provide an empirical analysis using a baseline panel of annual data for developed and 
developing countries and covering the years 1995-2009. The panel is reduced for 
alternative applications. First, we intend to test the (reverse) Granger-causality between 
the size of non-observed economy and income inequality. Second, we intend to assess 
the impacts of the non-observed economy on inequality in a more detailed way, 
controlling for other determinants of inequality and non-observed economy, using the 
Two-Stage Least Squares methodology. Finally, chapter 5 encloses the main 
conclusions of the work.
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2. Definitions and Macroeconomic Implications of Non-observed 
Economy and Inequality 

2.1.Definitions of Inequality and Non-observed Economy 
 
Inequality is a rather wide concept and its multiple dimensions appear to have 
diversified impacts on the economic activity. In fact, in the literature we find alternative 
definitions of inequality such as gender, education, access to employment, and wealth 
and income distribution inequality, which have diverse impacts on the economy. 
Though, most of literature extensively refers to income and wealth inequality, since it 
better encompasses all the dimensions of inequality across individuals (Neves and Silva, 
2014). This is also the definition that we will adopt hereafter in this work. The Gini 
coefficient is the most commonly used measure to distinguish between economies 
where the income distribution is more equal (values close to 0) or more unequal (values 
close to 1). 
For some authors, income inequality is often linked with the functioning of the 
labour market: major increases in inequality occur when the labour share of the income 
distribution falls, once wage inequality is smaller than that of non-labour incomes 
(Bertoli and Farina, 2007). Some other authors, relying on the Stopler-Samuelson 
theorem, argue that income inequality may also result from trade, revealing that an 
increase on trade increases income in high-skilled abundant countries while it decreases 
income in low-skilled abundant countries (cfr. Kurokawa, 2014). In this work we will 
explore how the dimension of non-observed sector affects inequality, in either through a 
unilateral or bilateral relation.
The designation of non-observed economy varies across the literature. In fact, 
we can find it labelled as underground, shadow, unofficial, parallel, irregular, black, 
subterranean, hidden, occult, informal and, finally, as non-observed economy. In order 
to be consistent it is important to assess the designation that prevails in the literature. 
OECD (2002) provides a terminology that allows us to categorize the different sets of 
non-observed activities. The terminology includes four different categories of activities 
in the definition of Non-observed Economy: (i) underground production – this considers 
activities that are productive and legal but are deliberately hidden from the authorities to 
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avoid taxes or restricting regulations; (ii) illegal production – activities that are 
productive but result in goods and services forbidden by law; (iii) informal sector – 
activities that are also productive but come from unregistered companies or households; 
and finally, (iv) self-consumption – production of households for own final use. Later, 
OECD (2014) added a fifth set of non-observed activities labelled as statistical 
underground, a residual category that includes data that missed from being accounted 
due to statistical errors or software deficiencies. Still, the definition remains relatively 
common: the non-reported economy refers to all activities that contribute to the overall 
production of a given country but is not reported to the governments (cfr. Rosser Jr. et 
al., 2000). From hereafter, and for the sake of being fully encompassing, we will refer 
to all these activities as non-observed economy (NOE).  
Because of not being officially registered, this causes difficulties on the 
identification of non-observed activities or of the economic agents involved, and thus 
on its quantification (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Schneider and Enste (2000) identify 
non-observed activities as monetary or non-monetary, legal or illegal and, within the 
former categorization, activities are further classified as resulting from tax avoidance or 
tax evasion (see Table 1). Such categorization makes more clear what should or should 
not be included under the label of non-observed activity. Schneider and Enste (2002) 
test the effect of enforcement on the size of the non-observed sector and find that more 
than the fiscal policy, government’s enforcement is a far more important determinant of 
the non-observed sector. Other authors focus on the relationship between corruption and 
the size of non-observed sector (e.g., Choi and Thum, 2005, and Dreher and Schneider, 
2010). 
 
Table 1. Schneider and Enste’s classification of Shadow Economy. 
 Monetary Transactions Non-monetary Transactions 
Illegal Activities 
 
Trade in stolen goods: drug dealings and 
manufacturing; prostitution, gambling; 
smuggling and fraud 
Barter: drugs, stolen goods, smuggling 
etc. Produce or growing drugs for own 
use 
Legal Activities 
Tax Evasion 
Unreported income 
from self-
employment; wages, 
Tax Avoidance 
Employee 
discounts, fringe 
benefits 
Tax Evasion 
Barter of legal 
services and goods 
Tax Avoidance 
All do-it yourself 
work and 
neighbour help 
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salaries and assets 
from unreported 
work related to legal 
services and goods 
Source: Cfr. Schneider and Enste (2000). 
 
The dimension of the non-observed sector can be assessed by: (i) direct 
approaches; (ii) indirect approaches; (iii) currency approach; and (iv) dynamic general 
equilibrium models. The direct approach consists on micro-economic or micro-
econometric methods which gather data on households through surveys and interviews 
or through tax audit. Because they rely on voluntary answers to queries, it is often 
argued that these methods fail to consistently reveal all non-observed activities; 
moreover, the difficulties on collecting the necessary information also makes this 
method to be the least used and the most prone to devious estimations (cfr. Abdih and 
Medina, 2013). The indirect approach explores the macroeconomic links that can be 
assessed between the size of non-observed sector and the overall economy. Among 
others, there is a comparison of the differences between the national income and total 
expenditures, between the actual and the official labour force participation (any 
difference may arise from non-observed labour); between overall transactions and 
national income and, finally, some methods rely on the strong correlation between the 
growth of electricity consumption and the GDP growth rate (taking electricity 
consumption as one of the best indicators of overall economic activity, official and 
unofficial, estimations of unofficial economy rely on the analysis of deviations between 
the electricity consumption and the official GDP growth rates). Although indirect 
approaches are widely used in the literature, these methods present limitations such as 
automatically neglecting all the other activities that also gather important dimensions of 
the non-observed sector when strictly using one (Schneider, 2005). Third, the currency 
approach is based under the strong assumption that transactions amid non-observed 
activities are made in cash in order to escape to any form of recording. This approach 
estimates the volume of the non-observed transactions by assessing the differences 
between the increase in effective currency demand and currency demand 
econometrically estimated based on conventional factors (fundamentals). Estimations 
require data on variables such as development of income, payment habits, interest rates, 
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etc., (Schneider, 1986). Then, the discrepancies between both values are attributed to 
unconventional factors, like non-registered activities (Tanzi, 1980). However, this 
approach presents major difficulties in finding the right factors (and data) to reliably 
assess the “formal” currency demand. Fourth, dynamic general equilibrium models rely 
on microeconomic founded assumptions that avoid ad-hoc econometric specifications 
and assumptions that tend to lead to subsequent and cumulative estimation errors (Elgin 
and Oztunali, 2012). In particular, Elgin and Oztunali (2012) rely on a two sector 
model: formal and non-observed and they match observable variables from the data 
gathered and then back out the estimations for the unobservable variables. The authors 
drew a model and solved it in steady state. This step is important in order to assess the 
different parameters of their model based on observable and available data for the 
countries. Finally, after calibrating the parameters, they run their non-observed 
economy estimation retrieving the size on non-observed sector in terms of GDP. Their 
estimations cover 161 countries with data from 1950 up to 2009. The observable 
variables considered in their model regard items such as labour output and productivity, 
consumption, unemployment, informal technology and hours devoted from households 
to formal technologies of production. 
 
2.2. Macroeconomic Implications 
 
In this section we intend to give an overview of the main macroeconomic 
implications of inequality and non-observed economy. The aim is to compile, in brief, 
the main consequences of both on economic growth, as well as on other selected 
macroeconomic variables. 
Income inequality has been approached through various dimensions in the 
literature. First, regarding the relationship with the evolution of income per capita, 
Kuznets (1955) firstly demonstrated that such relationship exhibited a hump-shaped 
form.  
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Figure 1. Kuznet’s Curve 
 
 
 
In fact, as the figure shows, according to the Kuznets hypothesis, income 
inequality tends to increase alongside with economic growth for lower income countries 
and, from a sufficiently high per capita income onwards, returns to lower levels of 
inequality as per capita income rises. Finding support for the Kuznets hypothesis, 
Alderson and Nielson (1997), focusing on the evolution of U.S economy between 70 
and 90’s, explained the U-Turn of inequality levels that U.S economic growth faced 
during that period. Furthermore, the authors were able to separate the phenomenon in 
two different strands of variables: (i) related to the impact of economic development 
and (ii) the ones that contributed to the upswing in income equality in the U.S economy. 
For the first category of variables, the authors controlled for urbanization and found that 
this has a positive impact on inequality; shifts from agriculture to others sectors reveal a 
non-relevant impact on income inequality; increases of population are, in the author’s 
perspective a weak indicator for income inequality; heterogeneity of educational 
attainment revealed a strong impact on income inequality, which in turn revealed that 
education plays a major role in advanced economies and on income distribution; racial 
dualism in the U.S was also found to be relevant to the dynamics of income inequality. 
For the second strand of variables the authors mentioned female labour force to be 
strongly and negatively linked to the increase of income inequality, which supports the 
U-Turn hypothesis. This study allows understanding the complex dynamics between 
growth and income inequality. Indeed, this analysis suggests that the direction of the 
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impacts are not linear and may depend on the growth stage of a particular economy, 
hence highlighting a relevant factor to take into account when analysing income 
inequality: stage of growth or development of countries. 
Goldberg and Pacvnik (2007), focusing on globalization effects on developing 
countries (which are the group of countries that present higher growth rates of income 
per capita) in the 80s and the 90s, show that the effects are positive on income 
inequality. The arguments presented in their analysis suggest that globalization 
increases income inequality mainly due to restricted labour market that prevents 
sectorial labour reallocation from agriculture to industrial activities, constraining the 
economic adjustments to operate within industrial activities instead of across all sectors 
of the economy. 
Earlier, Klasen (2004) called this type of globalization pro-poor growth, while 
Basu (2006) enhanced the ambiguous effect of globalization on income inequality and 
the verdict should derive from the nature of the globalization. Moreover, Goldberg and 
Pacvnik (2007) conclude that the relationship between globalization and inequality is 
country, time and case specific. 
Based on Neves and Silva (2014) survey on empirical facts about inequality and 
growth we identify four main implications of increases inequality amid countries. First, 
credit market imperfections imply that imperfections per se are the borrowing 
constraints that arise whenever one is applying for financing. In fact, the more unequal 
is income distribution, the larger the proportion of population constrained in the access 
to credit and financing. That leads us to the conclusion that unequal economies cannot 
have a financial system that can fulfil its primary function of resource distribution from 
who possess financial resources to those who demand credit for investment. In this 
view, the income inequality may, in fact, be an obstacle to economic growth. 
Second, the fiscal policy also determines a negative link between inequality and 
economic growth. The link is established through the “political mechanism” (see, e.g., 
Perotti, 1996) that revolves around the assumption that fiscal policy is decided 
according to the interests of the median voter. That implies that lower-wage individuals, 
who benefit from tax revenues, will rather support policies with higher tax rates, if the 
median voter theorem holds; this leads to an overall higher tax rate. Thus, more 
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inequality means, on the one hand, more government expenditures and higher tax rates. 
Higher tax rates, in turn, discourage investment, negatively affecting growth. 
Third, the socio-political instability shows as well negative impacts of inequality 
on long-term growth. This channel is based upon two main links, the first being the 
relation that can arise from inequality and political instability. In fact, more unequal 
income distribution among individuals from the same country can lead to riots or strong 
deviations from the government policies (Keefer and Knack, 2002). The second link 
builds up on the relation between the political instability and economic growth in which 
it is set that instability discourages investment. Uncertainty is one of the main elements 
to take into consideration when deciding whether to concretize an investment and 
whenever governments fail to be respected by their peers that disfavours the perception 
of investment security. Hence, this link also enhances the attention that must be given to 
income inequality reduction to stimulate investment and consequently long term 
economic growth. Moreover, this channel remains the single one of the four on which 
there is consensus on its negative impacts. 
Last and fourth, savings are the only factor that can identify benefits of 
inequality on economic growth. According to Kaldor (1956), richer individuals are 
more prone to save, thus inequality in this context promotes investment and growth 
through the savings of the wealthiest. Still, when adding the credit imperfections 
channel to the analysis, the results change over time. Indeed, Galor and Moav (2004) 
reach the conclusion that, in early phases characterized by scarce resources, the positive 
effect tends to be dominant. However, as economies develop and resources become 
abundant, this link becomes negative. 
Although the main implications of inequality on economic growth have been 
identified, it is important to stress that empirical evidence have not yet reached a 
consensus, except for the third, on the effects of inequality on growth.  
According to the adopted definition of non-observed sector, we can intuitively 
say that the proliferation of not registered (not quantified) economic activities may lead 
to important macroeconomic implications. In line with the precedent analysis, we will 
now enumerate some of the main macroeconomic consequences from a large or 
increasing non-observed sector. It is possible to find in the literature implications in the 
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following sectors or variables: (i) public provided services; (ii) monetary policy and 
inflation; (iii) fiscal policy; (iv) labour market; (v) corruption and (vi) economic growth. 
Unregistered transactions imply, as we have previously said in the precedent 
section, potential fiscal losses and, as a consequence, any increase in the non-observed 
activity will increase those potential losses. Schneider (2005) mentioned that it is fair to 
assume that increases in non-observed sector generate losses in government revenues. 
Increases in the non-observed sector are, according to the author, significantly 
associated with rises in taxes and social contributions, generating a counterproductive 
effect and encouraging agents to opt for non-observed activities. Thereby, the countries 
decrease their budget revenues, thus leading to reductions on quality and quantity of 
public provided goods. The first implication will drive us to the conclusion that non-
observed sector worsens overall welfare by reducing the ability of the states to carry on 
adequate provision of quality public goods and services that enhance growth and 
welfare (for a review, see Agénor and Yilmaz, 2013). 
The second issue that seems to arise was pointed by Houston (1987) and claims 
that the larger the non-observed sector the stronger will be the effect on inflation 
through monetary policy (cfr. Schneider, 2005). This means that countries that present 
higher estimations of non-observed economy cannot be able to accurately control their 
monetary policy thus creating more than desired inflation. Inflation appears as a result 
of economies expanding and growing, however the countries have no interest in bearing 
high rates of inflation. As an example, not correctly anticipated inflation may contribute 
to the following issues: lower-than-expected purchasing power of the agents; increases 
in spending since the real interest rates may tend to be near zero – this will enlarge the 
magnitude of the impacts since spending generated inflation – and, finally, decrease in 
savings (Houston, 1987). Therefore, activities that remain non-observed will act in the 
economy at their own pace, and prevent the effectiveness of the monetary policy. 
Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) find, through the use of a theoretical model that 
computes fiscal multipliers, that the non-observed sector is positively affected by 
expansionary fiscal policies. However, the impacts on multipliers depend on where the 
demand is directed to. If demand happens to be directed towards formal market, then 
the real impacts of fiscal policies underperform expected results by an estimated 12%. 
However, if demand directs towards non-observed markets, the underperformance can 
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reach 40%. Hence, these results mean that countries won’t be able to effectively 
conduct fiscal policy if they are not fully aware of the size of their non-observed 
markets. 
Additional research focusing on non-observed economy (NOE) and wages 
advocates that non-observed labour markets are more sensitive to macroeconomic 
impacts than over-regulated environments (Estevão and Filho, 2012). In particular, due 
to lower labour rigidities, wages become more flexible to macroeconomic conditions 
and thus allow for a quicker and less unemployment-painful economic adjustment. 
Hence, non-observed labour market reacts better to changes in unemployment rates, 
contrasting with the adjustment in observed-labour markets. 
Corruption is also an issue extensively discussed in the literature when regarding 
the non-observed economy; however, no consensus has been reached so far. Choi and 
Thum (2005) enhance the important role that plays quality of institutions as an 
instrument that supports the official activities. Following their reasoning, the authors 
state that non-observed activities arise as distortions from the official ones, for example 
as an attempt to increase private gains. Furthermore when testing for the impacts of 
corruption on the official economy, they find that the non-observed economy can be 
both: a complement – growing in the same proportion of the official activities – and a 
substitute – when non-observed sector absorbs part of the official economic activities 
and compete for resources – these depend on the market context. These findings are 
relevant since they allow to conclude that shadow economy cannot be eradicated 
without understanding if it comes as a complement or instead, as a substitute, of formal 
activities. Moreover, reducing the size of the non-observed economy without fighting 
corruption is counterproductive. More recently, Dreher and Schneider (2010) test for 
the hypothesis that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income 
countries while being complements in low-income countries and find little support to 
their premise. Nonetheless, these authors also stress the non-negligent relationship 
existing between corruption and institutions quality which is in line with the previous 
authors results on this subject.  
According to Schneider and Enste (2002), their empirical analysis is not 
conclusive on the effects of non-observed economy on economic growth. On the one 
hand, it is possible to conclude that a decreasing non-observed sector enhances tax 
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revenues, making it possible for government to increase public spending which, in turn, 
can result in improvements on infrastructures and services, essential for promoting 
economic growth. On the other hand, the authors stress that there is some evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that the non-observed economy is more competitive than the 
formal economy, also being able to stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, earnings 
originated in the non-observed economy are spent in the formal economy, thus 
stimulating the economic activity by increasing private consumption. Hence, Schneider 
and Enste (2000) identify the vicious circle in which economies can step into due to 
increasing non-observed sector: increasing taxes is an incentive for economic agents to 
take the “exit option”, and become part of non-observed economy. In turn, a greater 
non-observed economy erodes fiscal revenues and worsens the public deficit, leading to 
the gradual weakening of economic and social conditions for growth. 
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3. Mechanisms relating the Size of Non-observed Sector and 
Inequality 
 
Studies on non-observed economy do not explicitly link the size of the non-
observed sector to changes in inequality. In fact, this effect is rather neglected in the 
literature. Schneider and Enste (2000) found that an increasing non-observed sector is 
positively related to high taxes and high social transfers. This implies that, on the one 
hand, by presenting high levels of taxation, the economies are encouraging lower-
income social classes to move towards non-registered activities that, by not complying 
with regulations nor taxes, are less expensive, and hence more profitable. This argument 
states that agents may find more benefits from producing in such activities, thus 
increasing the size of non-observed economy. Similarly, high social contributions 
discourage formal labour. On the other hand, relying on the redistributive function of 
the state (see, e.g., Musgrave, 1960, Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000), the expected 
outcome that can derive from high taxes and social transfers is a more efficient 
functional income distribution by the government, thus reducing income inequality. Put 
together, these arguments lead to the conclusion that a more equal distribution of 
income leads to an increase in the size of the non-observed sector. 
However, once income inequality started being included in the analysis, recent 
literature has delivered results against this conclusion. Winkelried (2005) later found 
that higher government transfers reduce the size of the non-observed economy, which 
rejects Schneider and Enste’s (2000) primary results. Besides, several studies cover 
different sets of non-observed economy. We will identify and explain the mechanisms 
relating income inequality and NOE, making explicit which type of NOE activities 
(following the OECD typology presented in Section 1, above) are relevant for each 
particular mechanism.  
Some recent literature, more firm-oriented, reports that it is possible to link 
income distribution and the size of the non-observed sector through three main channels 
(e.g., Mishra and Ray, 2010): (i) aggregate demand; (ii) corruption and (iii) productivity 
or efficiency. While the first channel explains the relation between inequality and non-
observed economy, the remainders rely on the reverse causality. 
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Mechanisms operating from non-observed economy to inequality are the result 
of high levels of informality that arise significant economic distortions which affect 
income inequality. As recurring mechanisms there are (i) corruption; (ii) firm efficiency 
and (iii) wages. For the first, there is evidence that corruption is undeniably linked to 
the non-observed economy, (Choi and Thum, 2005). Second, firms’ efficiency or 
productivity among observed and non-observed activities are significantly different 
(Busso et al., 2012). Unproductive or inefficient firms cannot generate the same returns 
as the remainders, thus this affects wage distribution and income inequality. Third, 
wages are the most important indicator for income inequality and wage inequality 
relation with informality is rather not clear. On the one hand, when fighting inequality 
by rising minimum wages there is evidence for increase of non-observed economy 
(Canelas, 2014) while, on the other hand, policies and studies about lowering non-
observed economy point towards more equally distributed incomes. Hence, this 
strengthens the importance of assessing the causality nexus between non-observed 
economy and inequality determinants. 
 
3.1. Mechanisms Operating from Inequality to Non-Observed Economy 
 
Mechanisms operating from inequality to non-observed economy are the result 
of unequal income distribution that may or may not promote higher levels of estimated 
non-observed economic activities. 
The first channel in Mishra and Ray (2010) works mainly through the 
composition of aggregate demand and regards the set of non-observed economic 
activities that consists of underground production. Underground production, includes 
legal and productive activities that are deliberately hidden from the authorities, hence 
not being registered (OECD, 2002). Relying on the income distribution of consumers as 
the main determinant of demand composition and assuming that underground firms 
produce lower quality and more affordable goods, higher inequality will encourage 
underground firms to prosper since cheaper products dominate the consumption basket 
of lower-income classes. Registered firms are thus less profitable in high inequality 
contexts, assuming that their products are more expensive and cannot be bought by the 
overall potential demand. In the same vein, Winkelried (2005) also enhances that the 
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decision for firms to become or not underground depends on the composition of the 
aggregate demand. The larger the middle class is, the more equally distributed income 
is and the less profitable it is for firms to become underground. In this context, families 
can afford to buy goods provided by registered firms. The argument relates demand 
environment with the decision for firms to switch towards the underground activity. 
Underground activities do not pay taxes nor benefit explicitly from any public good; 
they are profitable only if the demand is sufficient to meet their production and usually 
set more competitive (lower) prices. In turn, demand for NOE goods mainly depends on 
income distribution of consumers. Since low income classes are prone to cheaper goods, 
consumers must enjoy a sufficiently high standard of living in order to discourage firms 
to go underground. According to the author’s view, underground activities result from a 
non-equitable distribution of income which pushes firms towards informality. The 
author complements these arguments by illustrating that the level on income influences 
non-observed economy. He uses two different proxies for income inequality, 
mentioning that GDP per capita is far from being an effective measure of income or 
even development due to the significant share of GDP that arise from a little number of 
firms. First, the author relies on the Gini Coefficient to find a positive link between the 
size of the underground activity and income inequality. Second, he performs a similar 
analysis using the size of the middle class as a proxy for income inequality which is 
represented through the share of total income belonging to third and fourth quintiles of 
the distribution of income; in this case, results point towards a negative link between the 
two, i.e., the larger the size of the middle class the smaller is underground activity. 
Winkelried (2005) provides evidence that a higher GDP per capita relates to a lower 
underground sector and that higher transfers reduce non-observed sector, which rejects 
Schneider’s (2005) premise that indicated an opposite relation between transfers and 
informal activity. The authors also enhance the effective role that higher taxes play in 
reducing non-observed economy along with a concentrated income distribution towards 
the middle class, i.e. lower income inequalities. This evidence was provided using data 
for Mexico, between 1992 and 2002 through OLS regressions. 
More recently, Benjamin et al. (2014) also provide evidence for the fact that 
larger informality means lower productivity. As a result, lower productivity leads to 
lower average wages. Therefore, the more unequal distribution of firms between formal 
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and informal activities, the more unequal will be income distribution. Thus, the more 
underground firms there are, the greater will be income inequality according to these 
arguments, which may also support the reverse order of causality. 
The studies that follow cover the broad definition of non-observed economy, 
i.e., including all the sets of not registered activities identified in section 1. Chong and 
Gradstein (2007) claim that more developed countries, where income distribution is less 
unequal and institutions have more quality, observe a smaller non-observed sector. 
Hence, raising the importance of countries stage of development for the assessment of 
mechanisms operating between income inequality and non-observed economy. The 
authors propose a theoretical model in which they show that non-observed economy is 
positively related to income distribution. This positive link is based upon the fact that 
the economy may create an environment prone to lower benefits that are entitled, 
conditional on formal records, to the poorer classes, thus encouraging shifts towards 
activities in the non-observed sector. This environment may derive from increases in 
taxes or from poor quality of institutions. The authors also find that the relation between 
the two is more preeminent when governments fail to provide quality services for their 
population. In fact, institutions can be an endogenous decisive factor for this causality 
nexus, as institutions are the authority that stands between the governments and the 
economic agents. Hence, quality institutions can guide and support the functional 
distribution of income among the lower-class individuals and the poor, reducing poverty 
and, in turn, income inequality. Moreover, the authors also included labour rigidities as 
one of the independent variables due to the strong links that arise from labour markets 
with income distribution and with non-observed labour which, in turn, is also an 
important part of the non-observed economy. As an example, according to Bertoli and 
Farina (2007), income is more equally distributed in formal labour markets than in non-
observed labour markets (probably because of progressive tax corrections), hence 
linking inequality with increases in the non-observed labour. It is also clear that a lower 
wealth endowment, characterizing poorer countries, is positively related to large 
estimates for the non-observed economy. Moreover, Chong and Gradstein (2007) show 
that labour rigidities and the tax burden lose statistical significance in explaining non-
observed economy, when regressors also include the Gini Coefficient capturing income 
inequality. This confirms that income inequality has an important role on determining 
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the size of the non-observed economy. However the impacts of income inequality vary 
depending on the methods used to estimate the size of the non-observed economy (see 
section 2.1, above). The study covered estimations following the macro-electrical and 
the demand for currency approaches, which had different values for the size of the non-
observed economy. In fact, the macro-electrical approach presents an average of 28% of 
the overall GDP of the sample, 11% for industrial economies and 40% for developing 
countries; the currency demand presents and average size of the non-observed economy 
of 32%, in which developing countries have an average of 36%. The authors highlight 
the U.S as the country with the lowest estimation – 9% of GDP, and Bolivia owning the 
highest percentage – 67%. Although the estimations are different, the estimated 
correlation between the two is about 96%. Both estimations cover the 1990’s. As for the 
results, both proved to have the same direction, although the intensity of the impact 
varies significantly. According to the authors, an increase of the Gini Coefficient from 
0.49 to 0.57 (which means an increase in inequality) leads to an increase of the size of 
the non-observed economy by 3% using the demand for currency approach and by 9% 
using data from the macro-electrical approach. While the results remain consistent with 
each other, this information reveals the importance of the approach used to estimate 
non-observed economy for any analysis. Regarding the quality of institutions the results 
proved to be consistent with the hypothesis of an inverse relation with non-observed 
economy regardless of the proxy used and the set of non-observed economy 
estimations. Their empirical method controlled for this issue using aggregate 
governance, corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government stability and 
democratic accountability. This study included data for 86 countries during the 90s. 
Rosser Jr. et al. (2003), focusing their work on a sample of 18 transition 
economies with data from 1989 to 1994, have also found that other potential 
determinants of non-observed economy lose statistical significance when adding 
inequality. This finding is essential since the largest estimated increase in the non-
observed economy belongs to transition economies. The authors estimate the impacts on 
the size of the non-observed economy using two alternative models. In the first model, 
the Gini Coefficient is used as a regressor, together with indexes of democratic rights 
and economic freedom, unemployment rates, cumulative decline GDP (adjusted for 
estimated changes in the non-observed sector) and the maximum annual rate of 
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inflation. In the second model, they perform exact the same regression but exclude the 
Gini Coefficient from the set of explanatory variables. They conclude that, in the first 
model, Gini Coefficient is the only statistically significant variable (5% significance 
level) to explain increases in the non-observed sector. In the second model, only the 
maximum annual rate of inflation is statistically significant at 1%. Despite not being 
statistically relevant, the other variables exhibit a positive estimated effect on non-
observed economy. Their study also concludes by stressing the importance of the 
quality of institutions for the size of NOE, which is in line with Chong and Gradstein 
(2007) findings. Moreover, the authors also found that tax reductions depress 
economies since they lead to losses of fiscal revenues and do not significantly 
contribute to decrease non-observed economy. Once more, the primary evidence of 
taxes as one of the most important determinants of non-observed economy is rejected 
by these authors.  
One may associate, albeit with reservation, that taxation and its corresponding 
conversion into transfers may enhance income distribution. Dessy and Pallage (2003) 
demonstrate through a heterogeneous-agent model the ambiguous effect of taxation in 
the increase of the estimated size of the non-observed economy. In line with Schneider 
and Enste (2000), the authors also identify the level of taxation as one of the main 
determinants of non-observed economy. Reviewing previous works, the authors 
reinforce that, for a given increase in the tax rate, lower income classes have incentive 
to go underground, informal or illegal (according to our previous categorization) since 
they are unable to face such costs. This effect is more pronounced in poorer countries, 
enhancing that the more unequal economies are, the greater is the stimulus to increase 
the non-observed sector. However, the results from their model also demonstrate that 
tax decreases can also work in stimulating NOE. In fact, when decreasing taxation, the 
number of agents that are better-off in the non-observed economy rises according to 
their model. The economic explanation for this to happen is that for any tax level below 
the threshold – a value perceived as a tax equilibrium – any decrease sends the message 
that the contribution of the actual infrastructure is high enough as it is, allowing firms 
and individuals to be free-riders. The agents benefit from public goods but do not 
contribute, hence increasing the size of NOE through fiscal evasion, for example. This 
result contradicts the expected impact on the size of NOE of lowering taxes. This leads 
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the authors to the conclusion that there is a threshold for taxation below which NOE 
may rise due taxes reduction. Their model may provide an explanation for the 
statistically non-significant results obtained by Chong and Gradstein (2007) and Rosser 
Jr. et al. (2003) for taxes as an explanatory variable for the size of NOE, works that 
were previously mentioned in this review of literature. The figure below represents the 
results indicated by the authors on NOE due to tax changes. 
 
Figure 2. Ambiguous behaviour of non-observed Economy regarding tax rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Self-made using explanations from Dessy and Pallage (2003) 
 
In order to fully understand the depth of tax ambiguity, it is necessary to 
comprehend the motives for tax compliance. In this matter, Nicolaides (2014) argues 
that tax compliance will depend on three main factors: (i) consumption utility gained, 
(ii) the psychological externality payoff arising from social norms and finally (iii) the 
utility of the public good that it directly related with the quality of institutions.1 In this 
context, the institutions represent, on the one hand, the benevolence through solidarity 
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intent to eliminate the tax compliance indeterminacy. In this analysis, institutions are a 
factor that influences the decision of individuals to whether or not pay taxes and 
elucidates the relation that is implied within the tax compliance and quality of 
institutions: more taxes mean more possibility to provide quality institutions and, in 
turn, this means quality public goods and increases of welfare. However this perception 
will ultimately depend on the audits performed by the institutions or, if these fail to 
succeed in the eyes of society, the social norms play the most important part. Thus, tax 
hikes can have ambiguous effects on the increase of the non-observed sector, 
depending, simultaneously, on the income inequality context that characterizes the 
country, together with social norms and quality of institutions. These results are in line 
with Dessy and Pallage (2003) model that also predicts ambiguous effect of taxes on 
NOE. 
Furthermore, Singh et al. (2012) conclude that institutions are far more 
important for the determination of non-observed economy than taxes. Their analysis 
was build using non-observed economy estimations, governance and rule of law indexes 
for 100 countries that include advanced, emerging and developing economies for the 
year 2000. The authors find an inverse relation between increasing size of NOE and 
quality of institutions. Their findings rely upon the assumption that agents may benefit 
from underground activities not to avoid higher taxes but, instead, to avoid compliance 
with another variety of legal/bureaucratic obligations required by institutions, which 
are, in the agent’s perspective excessively onerous (more so under high levels of 
corruption). This is consistent with precedent analysis of Schneider (2005) that had also 
revealed that the government’s authority (considering that institutions represent, in fact, 
law enforcement) is a more important determinant of non-observed activities than taxes. 
Moreover, in countries with highly equal income distribution, or richer countries, 
lowering taxes can only be counterproductive when aiming at reducing non-observed 
economy, since the governments are only lowering their fiscal revenues with no visible 
effects on non-observed economy levels, since, according to this study taxes are not the 
most relevant mechanism to do so. Furthermore, this analysis is also in line with Dessy 
and Pallage (2003) argument about tax ambiguous impacts on NOE. 
Mechanisms from inequality to NOE may also operate through the incentives for 
specific fiscal policies aiming at reducing inequality. Canelas (2014) studies the effects 
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of changes in the minimum wage on informality in Ecuador through a framework that 
assumes the following: (i) minimum wage is the strongest instrument to reduce 
inequality, establishing minimal earnings and living conditions for individuals; (ii) rises 
in minimum wage are followed by rises in wages in formal productivity hence, 
increasing unemployment; (iii) individuals that no longer work formal labour may enter 
one of the two categories: remain unemployed or work in the informal sector; (iv) 
informal industries are assumed to practice lower wages, as a result of increasing job 
demanders for the informal labour. This analysis was applied in Ecuador, where 
informal labour is estimated to be between 60%-80% and Gini Coefficient is near 0.49, 
a country exhibiting high levels of informality and inequality that needed to be 
understood. The study shows that, increases in the minimum wage satisfy the first three 
assumptions but fail to verify the fourth. In fact, higher minimum wages, besides 
increasing the averages wages and unemployment, were also increasing average wages 
for informal labour. The main conclusion is that, even in the informal industry, the 
minimum wage remains a benchmark for overall individuals.  
To our analysis, this means that, fighting inequality through minimum wages 
may increase non-observed economy by raising the number of unemployed individuals 
willing to work in informal industries. Thus, high inequality may incentive public 
policies, such as minimum wages, that can lead to more non-observed economy. 
However, as evidence shows that the average wage increases in both formal and non-
formal labour markets, this particular mechanism fails to corroborate the reverse 
relation – that more non-observed economy further increases inequality.  
However there is evidence that in third world countries, namely Sub-Saharan 
African, where underdevelopment is so acute, even non-formal activities are seen as 
welfare and income-equality enhancing (Fox and Pimhidzai, 2011). Fox and Pimhidzai 
(2011) argue that the transformation of fundamentally agrarian countries and 
subsistence economies into urbanized, integrated and firm-dominated economies is the 
essence of the economic development. Their analysis focus on Uganda, which economy 
has shown to grow significantly over the past years and with important poverty 
reduction, although the available data fails to demonstrate this transformation. In fact, 
macroeconomic indicators were unable to provide information about this transformation 
that Uganda’s economy experienced. For the authors, since these changes occurred 
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through informal production, this evidence contributes for the debate on the effects of 
increasing informality on welfare. Moreover, along with economic growth, the data 
showed that wages had been increasing, as well as the job supply, and fostered 
reduction of poverty. The paper explains that in this context, where the individuals’ 
main job resource remain in farms (informal or self-production/consumption activities), 
the marginal benefit of working for non-formal, less efficient and low quality good 
industries is still attractive, thus employing numerous people. Moreover as the economy 
expands, more jobs are created encouraging wages to rise from the excess of job supply, 
hence reducing poverty. This specific context illustrates that, in fact, high unequal 
contexts provide conditions for increasing non-observed activities and, in turn, those 
same non-observed activities contribute to the decrease of inequality (reverse causality). 
Hence we conclude that the link highlighted in this section remains positive – more 
inequality means more non-observed sector – while the inverse is negative. In fact this 
analysis shows that under certain circumstances the increase in informal activity may 
boost the economy and reduce poverty and income inequality. However, inefficiencies 
and low quality products that results from non-formal activities may limit growth. In 
this specific case, the level of development of the economy is one of the main factors to 
take into account when making this assumption, since it is yet to be verified in more 
developed countries. The paper concludes by raising the question if this growth 
structure is sustainable overtime, once informal productivity does not bring any 
improvement in other sectors, according to these authors. 
As a conclusion to this section, the main mechanisms that seem to operate from 
inequality to NOE are: (i) income inequality itself represented through Gini Coefficient 
on which the literature seem to agree on co-movement between the two, primarily 
caused by high unequal income distribution; (ii) firm environment that encompasses the 
formal or informal firms in an economy which results from the (iii) demand 
environment, which, in turn, may be represented through Gini Coefficient or percentage 
of middle class income individuals; (iv) quality of institutions seem to play a decisive 
role as it is the entity that stands between authorities and individuals and is responsible 
for policy compliance; (v) labour market are also listed in the literature since it 
establishes a strong link between income revenues obtain through formal or informal 
labour and the overall state of the economy, although the main studies that included this 
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variable showed it not to be statistically relevant as a determinant of the size of NOE; 
(vi) increases on minimum wage that seem to operate only from inequality to NOE; (vii) 
social transfers to individuals on which there are no consensus and finally, (viii) taxes 
which brings a debate on their ambiguous effect on the size on the NOE and their 
undeniable link with quality of institutions, which in turn, are responsible for tax 
compliance in some authors perspective. 
The following table provides an overview of the main findings on this subject. 
 

Table 2. Overview of mechanisms operating from income inequality to the size of non-observed economy  


Author(s) Mechanism(s) Direction Sample 
Mishra and Ray (2010) 
Composition of 
aggregate demand 
• (+) unequal 
income 
distribution 
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
Developing countries, 
2002-2006 
Winkelried (2005) 
Composition of 
aggregate demand: 
(-) Middle 
class 
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
Mexico, 1992-2002 
Chong and Gradstein 
(2007) 
 
(-) institutional quality 
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
86 countries, 1990-2000 
 
 
Rosser Jr. et al (2003) 
 
(-) institutional quality 
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
 
18 transition countries, 
1989-1994 
 
Dessy and Pallage 
(2003) 
(+) taxes 
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
Theoretical Model – 
Heterogeneous agent-
model (-) taxes 
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
Canelas (2014) (+) minimum wage (-) Ineq causes (+) NOE 
 
Ecuador, 2000-2012 
(developing country) 
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Fox and Pimhidzai 
(2011) 
(+) economic activity 
First:  
(+) Ineq causes (+) 
NOE 
Uganda, 1992-2009  
(underdeveloped 
country) Final: 
(+) NOE causes  
(-) NOE 
 
3.2. Mechanisms Operating from Non-Observed Economy to Inequality 
 
Mechanisms operating from non-observed economy to inequality are the result 
of high estimated non-observed economic activities that may or may not cause 
economic distortions that affect income distribution. 
As regards the second channel in Mishra and Ray (2010) - corruption -, 
underground production (the first category of NOE following OECD typology) fosters 
income inequality. The corruption channel relies on recent findings that suggest that 
corruption feeds both the size of the underground sector and income inequality, hence 
creating a positive correlation between the two primarily caused by underground 
activities. In line with the conclusions of Rosser Jr. et al. (2003) and Dougherty and 
Escobar (2013), that also conclude for a potential positive link between NOE and 
corruption, their findings suggest that the prevalence of higher corruption increases non-
observed labour; corruption reduces the benefits that arise from public goods, more so 
under weak institutions, and this discourages agents to demand for formal jobs. Mishra 
and Ray (2010) stress that, the more informal firms there are, the greater is the need for 
inspectors, thus lowering their average wage and increasing inequality. This argument 
relies on the assumption that everything else remains constant, including total 
expenditures with measures to control for the informal sector. Under this assumption, 
when working for a smaller wage, inspectors are more prone to accept bribes (which the 
authors name as bribe-demand), therefore increasing non-observed sector through 
corruption. The link with inequality is two-sided: NOE increases inequality as it 
increases the fraction of low-paid jobs and, consequently, inequality increases 
corruption, and thus increases non-declared income. The study is conducted in a sample 
of developing and developed countries and for the period covering from 2002 to 2006. 
To gather information about the demand for bribe, the dependent variable, the authors 
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rely on data available from World Bank Enterprises Surveys that groups data about 
business environment (confidence in judicial system; efficiency of government; 
business constraints; age of firms; size of firms, etc) and other sources to gather data 
about macro corruption perception (CPI) and corruption risk indicators (ICRG). They 
represent bribe demand through a dummy variable (1 for bribe; 0 otherwise). The 
assessment of the effect of corruption, which is represented, in this case, through bribe 
demand, results from running the equation twice: first, using non-observed sales with 
bribe demand; second, the same variable without bribe demand, the difference being the 
bribe demand. They conclude that corruption contributes to higher profits for informal 
firms since they are protected from enforcement by corrupted inspectors. The authors 
conclude that non-observed economy and corruption, in this context complement each 
other. 
The last channel in in Mishra and Ray (2010) efficiency channel relies on the 
assumption that registered firms can generate more returns by being more productive 
and efficient; on the contrary, underground firms are less efficient, thus yielding lower 
returns. A premise that was also put forward by Benjamin et al. (2014). A large 
underground sector leads to lower average firms’ returns, boosting inequalities. Thus, 
depending on the composition of firms, if registered firms are highly productive and 
efficient, it is plausible to expect that lower returns from the underground firms affect 
inequality. More recently, a research using Mexican data from 1998 until 2008 was able 
to quantify some distortions that informality brings to firm’s productivity. In fact, Busso 
et al. (2012) found that factor productivity is lower for informal and illegal firms. This 
study estimated that one Mexican peso produces more 28% and 50% if allocated to 
formal firms than if it is allocated to illegal or informal firms, respectively. These 
results lead the authors to conclude also that informality contributes more than illegality 
to low productivity. However, when higher income distribution inequality is observed 
among consumers (first channel in Mishra and Ray, 2010), formal firms can be detained 
to enter the market due to high investment and wealth containment. In this context, 
underground firms can be more profitable than registered ones. Thus, revealing the 
importance of assessing the firm environment before making any assumptions on this 
channel. 
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Furthermore, Dessy and Pallage (2003) also found that registered firms benefit 
from a productivity premium that arises from formalization. This premium arises for 
firms that are complacent with the law alongside with high-quality institutions. 
Institutions of quality are crucial for the existence of the premium, since only registered 
firms can have access to such public good. 
Other research for developing countries shows that less NOE may decrease 
income inequality. Using Brazilian data from 2002 up to 2007, Meghir et al. (2012) 
found that if authorities increase the costs for informal activities by raising fines 
through increasing detection and inspection measures, this would result in higher 
average wages and increased welfare. This particular mechanism is such that markets 
will become more competitive, once increasing the costs of informality produces 
stronger stimulus for firms to become formal. This competition among formal firms will 
push the wages and profit margins up from becoming formal and will more than 
compensate the costs that informal firms incur. However, declines in informality 
decreases inequality only up until a certain extent. In fact, the authors present some 
complex results when testing for the abolishment of informal activities. Overall, welfare 
will still increase, although firms’ profits margins may increase or decrease, producing 
also ambiguous effects on wages – and, ultimately, on inequality. Ambiguity of effects 
depends on the market structure and economic contexts. Informal labour markets are 
assumed as growth promoters in developing countries (cfr. Meghir et al., 2012). 
Economies may grow from non-observed activities whenever informal firms can benefit 
from lower producing costs by not complying with regulation. In this context, informal 
firms still operate and increase employment although they are less productive than 
formal firms. 
Another study, using data for Russia from 2000 to 2010, also provides evidence 
that there is, in fact, difference between earnings in formal and in informal labour 
markets (Lukiyanova, 2015). This particular analysis concludes that earnings from 
informal labour are more prone to polarization, which leads to higher inequality. This 
study is consistent with the findings of Bertoli and Farina (2007) who advocated that 
there is a more equally wage distribution among the observed economic activities than 
among the non-observed, hence linking increases in inequality with the rise in informal 
labour. In particular, when testing for impacts of increases in informality on earnings 
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distribution, Lukiyanova (2015) finds that a 10% increase in NOE leads to a 1 to 5% 
increase in inequality. Although the results are relatively small, they are consistent with 
our premise that there is a causality nexus between the two. Furthermore, the author is 
able to assess that labour earnings inequality decrease through the decline of (i) hourly 
wage rates and/or (ii) working hours, which are the two factors that almost completely 
determine the evolution of earnings. For informal labour, the impact of working hours is 
more preeminent jointly with a higher dispersion of higher earnings. The definition of 
informal labour used in this study is consistent with the definitions provided by OECD 
that we are following along our work.  
Other research, using Italian data from 2000 until 2004, suggests that increasing 
informal labour reduces formal wages which increases inequality (Elia and Di Porto, 
2011). Elia and Di Porto (2011) also explain that informal work may be dominated by 
low-skill individuals; hence, reducing informal labour may lead to inequality decreases 
since workers may face higher levels of income by working in the observed economy. 
A research from the IMF tests the hypothesis that increases of non-observed 
labour may contribute to wage responsiveness in high-regulated environments (Estevão 
and Filho, 2012). The amount of informal workers may increase to avoid over-regulated 
work conditions, hence linking non-observed economy, inequality and the role of 
institutions. Chong and Gradstein (2007) had already mentioned the importance of the 
link between these three factors, enhancing that the causal relationship between NOE 
and income inequality is more significant under weak institutions. However, the results 
in Estevão and Filho (2012) show that environments that are excessively 
institutionalized may also affect NOE and inequality in the same direction. This 
research mainly concerns wage flexibility in Brazil between 1981 and 2009, which the 
authors demonstrated to be correlated with higher institutionalization; the authors found 
that, compared with the formal market, wages in the non-observed labour market were 
significantly more sensitive to macroeconomic impacts such as unemployment rates. 
 Evidence from Turkey between 2005 and 2009 also reveals that informal hourly 
wages are more sensitive to macroeconomic environments (Baltagi et al., 2012). 
Finally, another research conducted by the OECD also stresses that strong presence of 
institutions may lead to higher labour costs driving individuals towards informal labour, 
hence increasing NOE (cfr. Dougherty and Escobar, 2013). This latter study concerned 
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Mexican state data between 2005 and 2010 and controlled for other determinants of 
NOE, such as GDP, labour skills, differences among microenterprises, the cost to start 
up a business, foreign investment restrictions, the rule of law and finally corruption 
incidence. 
At this point, institutions are in fact a recurring factor shaping the relationship 
between NOE and income inequality. Davis (2007), accounting for the negative link 
between growth and inequality, indicates that restrictive institutions act as barriers for 
agents to become formal; thus informality lowers growth as informal activities are less 
productive (Busso et al., 2012) and increases income inequality.  
As the literature seems to show, it is possible to observe a positive link between 
non-observed economy and income inequality, meaning that an increase in NOE may 
stimulate a hike on the second. For the wage mechanism this means that there is 
ambiguous evidence, depending on the causality nexus, on the nature of the correlation 
between inequality and NOE. First, Canelas (2014) argues that fighting inequality 
through rising average wages leads to a greater non-observed economy. Second, 
research on the inverse relationship brings evidence for decreases of inequality through 
fighting non-observed activities, namely informal labour.  
The table below provides an overview of wages as a mechanism operating 
between inequality and non-observed economy: 
 
Table 3. Impacts of wages on inequality and non-observed economy 
Authors Direction 
Impacts on 
Inequality 
Impacts on NOE Relation 
Canelas (2014) Ineq->NOE (-) (+) Inverse 
Meghir et al. (2012) NOE->Ineq (-) (-) Co-movement 
Lukiyanova (2015) NOE->Ineq (+) (+) Co-movement 
Elia and Di Porto (2011) NOE->Ineq (+) (+) Co-movement 
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Through this overview it is possible to conclude that wages as a mechanism 
operating from non-observed economy to inequality are most likely to generate a co-
movement between the two. When operating from inequality to non-observed economy, 
although, evidence relying on in a single study apparently generates an inverse relation. 
More robust evidence is thus in order regarding the last causality nexus. Wage 
mechanism should be assessed accounting for the two important factors: (i) the 
direction of the causality nexus between NOE and inequality and (ii) the nature of co-
movements between both.  
Alternatively, there is an interesting approach of Binelli and Attanasio (2010) 
that proves the existing relationship between non-observed economy and income 
inequalities. In fact, their analysis explains that wage inequality increases 
simultaneously as the informal activity increases in Mexico, using data from 1987 up to 
2002. To do so the authors observed the percentiles activity of Gini hourly real wages 
amongst informal workers and formal ones over the years that allowed them to better 
observe dispersion. Hence, the conclusion was that inequality is always higher for 
informal workers than for formal ones both at the bottom and top of wage distributions. 
This means that informal workers, even the ones on less unequal positions (lower Gini 
hourly wage) are still more unequal than formal ones. Besides giving evidence between 
the non-observed economy and inequality, this analysis allows to illustrate clearly the 
divergence of behaviours of these variables. On the one hand, more informal activity 
leads to more unequal wage distribution and on the other hand more unequal wage 
distribution promotes higher non-observed activities. 
 
Table 4. Overview of mechanisms operating from non-observed Economy to inequality 
Author(s) Mechanism(s) Direction Sample 
Mishra and Ray (2010) 
(+) corruption 
(+) NOE cause (+) Ineq 
Developing countries, 
2002-2006 (-) productivity of 
informal firms 
Meghir et al. (2012) 
(+) Wages 
Costs of informality 
(-) NOE cause (-) Ineq Brazil, 2002- 2007 
Lukiyanova (2015) 
(+) Hourly wage 
inequality 
(+) NOE cause (+) Ineq Russia, 2000-2010 
30 

Elia and Di Porto 
(2011) 
(-) wage of low-skilled (+) NOE cause (+) Ineq Italia, 2000-2004 
Estevão and Filho 
(2012) 
(+) informal labour 
(+) NOE cause (+) Ineq 
Brazil, 1981-2009 
 
(-) quality of institutions 
Binelli and Attanasio 
(2010) 
(+) hourly wage 
inequality 
Both Directions Mexico, 1987-2002 
 
31 

4. Empirical Application 
  
 As we have seen in the previous chapters, the related literature suggests that the 
mechanisms operating between the two variables, NOE and inequality emerge mostly in 
developing countries. Indeed, most of the empirical literature covers groups of 
transition and emerging economies, or individual emerging. Several contributions show 
this fact for example, for Mexico, Winkelried (2005), Dougherty and Escobar (2013) 
and Busso et al. (2012); Russia in Lukyianova (2013); Brazil in Estevão and Filho 
(2012) and Turkey covered by Baltagi et al. (2012). Mishra and Ray (2010) also include 
developing economies their analysis (the sample gathers data also for developed 
countries). Rosser Jr. et al. (2003) also find a causal relation between the two variables 
for a sample of 18 transition economies. All studies are consistent with one another 
since the time range and the findings are rather similar, and they consensually sustain 
the existence of a strong relationship between income inequality and NOE for 
developing countries. The methodology used in Rosser Jr. et al. (2003), with a sample 
covering the time span 1989-1994, using OLS regression interchanging non-observed 
economy and Gini Coefficient as dependent variables, and allows the study of possible 
reverse effects: the authors first test the non-observed economy as the dependent 
variable and, second, choose the Gini Coefficient in the same position, using the same 
control variables. The other variables taken into consideration in this analysis were: 
economic freedom, adjusted cumulative decline of GDP, maximum annual rate of 
inflation, democratic rights index and the unemployment rate. Later, Chong and 
Gradstein (2007) include the effect of institutions by using the ICRG – International 
Country Risk Guide – index, instead of the democratic rights index. According to the 
authors, this index is more encompassing since it compiles data about the country’s 
political, economic and financial risks and institutions that, as shown in the literature 
review, above, correspond to one of the most relevant mechanisms beneath the 
relationship NOE-inequality.  
For developed economies little evidence exists on this subject. Moreover, 
neither theoretical nor empirical results presented in the literature are able to provide a 
clear overview of the relationship for different level-of-development regions or by type 
of countries. In fact, considering the countries covered by the papers reviewed before, 
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we cannot clearly distinguish differences in the relationship between NOE and 
Inequality categorized by country type or country groups. Since the economic structure 
of both groups (emerging and developed countries) is quite diverse, the relation of NOE 
and Inequality may not materialize alike for different characteristics of these economies. 
As the evidence shows, developed countries tend to have lower NOE estimations 
accompanied by lower income inequality and, reversely, emerging and developing 
economies tend to present higher estimations for both variables. Hence, it seems 
relevant to separate our data by groups of countries in order to overcome this 
shortcoming in the literature. 
The empirical application we propose in this chapter intends to be a contribution 
for the existent findings, namely by providing a categorization of results by country 
groups – developed and transition/developing countries - and to extend the analysis 
using the most updated data available. We will firstly explore the direction of causality 
nexus between NOE and Inequality for the two groups of countries and, secondly, 
provide a detailed analysis on the qualitative nature of such relationship(s). 
 
4.1. Causality Tests – Methodology and data description 
 
Our literature review aimed at encompassing all the main findings regarding the 
relationship between Inequality and NOE. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
study enhances the causal relationship between these two variables. It is rather evident 
that the two phenomena evolve similarly: higher estimation values of the non-observed 
economy come along with higher income inequalities. The following figure enhances 
this strong positive correlation between the two variables, by taking the average values 
for 40 countries for both the Gini Coefficient and NOE estimates, during the period 
1995-2009. 
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Figure 3. Correlation between Gini Coefficient and NOE estimates, average 1995-2009 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on data from the Worldbank and the Eurostat (accessed on July 
2015). 
 
We will use Granger Causality Tests to draw conclusions on the causality nexus 
between NOE and income inequality: are higher inequalities promoting higher non-
observed economies as a mean for lower income classes to improve their revenues? Or, 
on the contrary, is a higher non-observed sector creating economic dysfunctions that 
amplify bias in income distribution? Hereafter, we will refer to Income Inequality as 
Ineq and non-observed economy as NOE. 
The idea beneath using Granger Causality tests is to assess whether a certain 
economic series observed in the past affects another in the present. However, the 
question of causality is full of controversies since “everything causes everything” (cfr. 
Gujarati, 2009).  
The concept of precedence or predictive causality relies on the assumption that 
an economic time series contains useful information that allows predicting another 
economic time series. This way, this Granger Causality test assumes that all information 
relevant to the prediction is contained on the two economic time series. This method 
allows us to verify if Ineq contains useful information that predicts NOE, or on the 
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contrary, if it is NOE that is able to cause Ineq. The method corresponds to the 
estimation of the following equations: 
 
(4.1)    ∑ 	
	 	   ∑ 	
      
 
(4.2)   ∑ 	
	 	  ∑ 	
	      
 
The  represents errors that we assume are uncorrelated with the two 
parameters under analysis. Unidirectional causality from Ineq (NOE) to NOE (Ineq) is 
indicated if the estimated coefficients on the lagged NOE (Ineq) in 4.1 (4.2) are 
statistically different from zero as a group and the set of estimated coefficients on the 
lagged Ineq (NOE) is not statistically different from zero. Feedback, or bilateral 
causality, is suggested when the sets of Ineq and NOE coefficients are statistically 
significantly different from zero in both regressions. 
The test runs these equations for the two economic time series and retrieves 
results that express the statistically significance of all the coefficients. Granger causality 
test assumes that variables are stationary. The interpretation on the results is done by 
looking at the F-stats (or p-values) in order to assess overall statistically significance of 
the several coefficients. In particular, and since we use annual data, we include only one 
lag. 
Since the purpose of our analysis is to assess the direction of a hypothetical 
relation between NOE and income inequalities we will use NOE estimates in percent of 
GDP as one economic time series and Gini Coefficient estimates as a proxy for income 
inequalities being the second economic time series. Additionally we will categorize the 
countries amongst our sample by income levels according to World Bank’s criteria. 
This classification is important to allow assessing the causality relation across different 
groups of countries. Moreover, in order to add value to our research, we will also run 
the test using tax evasion and self-employment estimates in percent of GDP as more 
detailed proxies for NOE. These variables are some of the many forms taken by NOE. 
This test will assess its causal direction with Gini Coefficient. This complementary test 
intends to provide an exploratory explanation of the dynamics between forms of NOE 
and income inequality.  
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To run our Causality tests we have built two panels: one that gather information 
for 40 countries from 1995 up to 2009, categorized by income level; and another panel 
which contains data of 19 countries from 1999 up to 2010 to test causality using tax 
evasion and tax evasion accounting for self-employment. The software E-views was 
used to run the tests. 
 
• NON-OBSERVED ECONOMY 
Some recent studies used Buehn and Schneider (2012a) latest estimations. 
However, their estimations only cover the years from 1999 up to 2007, leaving out most 
recent. Furthermore, we consider that a sample counting only on 9 observations by 
country is not the most desirable sample to apply causality tests, since it may not 
encompass important economic information and features that derive from economic 
cycles. This is an important consideration since NOE is estimated in percentage of 
GDP, and GDP increases and decreases at different rhythms during economic cycles. 
Most up-to-date data available concerning NOE results from the estimations of Elgin 
and Oztunali (2012), a study that covers the period from 1950 up to 2009, providing a 
much greater window of data to our sample. We may refer, however, that the method 
used by both studies are rather different. Elgin and Oztunali (2012), as referred in the 
previous sections, used a two sector model in which they were able to back-out time-
varying estimations in percentage of GDP of the NOE for each country. The authors 
identify their model as a new approach not based on econometric specification or 
assumptions which may lead to errors (Elgin and Oztunali, 2012). To reach these 
results, the authors start by drawing a model and solving it in steady state; then, they 
calibrate the different parameters of the model to match the observable and available 
data for the countries. Finally, after calibrating the parameters, they run their NOE 
equation and estimate the size of the NOE in terms of GDP. 
Buehn and Schneider (2012a) used a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes 
(MIMIC) Model, which consists, in this particular case, in retrieving information about 
the size of the NOE by relying on observable and non-observable data and information. 
The non-observable variable (NOE) is linked to indicators and explanatory parameters 
through analytical and structural models designed by the authors. First, the authors 
establish the causes and indicators of NOE; then, following the relationship designed 
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between them and NOE, the authors are able to back-out the coefficients of the various 
indicators and by this way, estimate NOE. 
Chong and Gradstein (2007) provided evidence that the amplitude of effects of 
income inequalities in the determination of NOE may vary according to the NOE 
estimation method used for the analysis. Hence, it is mandatory to check if both 
databases are significantly different from each other in order to avoid gaps in our 
research. Therefore, to be more robust in the choice of the data, we assess the 
correlation regarding both estimations for the interval that includes the same years 
(1999-2007) and the same 40 countries. Both estimates present a correlation of almost 1 
(96%), which means that the estimated values of these studies are strongly correlated. 
Additionally, we have compared the average values for each country (see Figures 4): 
the averages are rather similar except for the Kryzyg Republic. Since Elgin and 
Oztunali (2012) provide a larger dataset, we choose to use the later in detriment of 
Schneider and Buehn (2012) estimates. 
 
 Figures 4.1. and 4.2. Comparison of NOE averages of the estimates of Buehn and Schneider (2012a) 
 and Elgin and Oztunali (2012) for 40 countries and for 1999-2007  








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Source: Authors own calculations based on data from Schneider and Buehn (2012) and Elgin and 
Oztunali (2012).  
 
• GINI COEFFICIENT 
 Regarding income inequality, and in line with the literature, we will use Gini 
Coefficient as a proxy. In fact, this measure is widely used to measure income 
inequality. Many studies use the database computed by Deininger and Squire (1996); 
however, this database does not contemplate every year for each country and has some 
duplicated data (different indicators) for a given year and country. Hence, in order to 
avoid these shortcomings, we have chosen the Gini Index estimates provided by the 
World Bank. This index estimates the extent to which disposable income distribution 
among the population of a certain economy deviates from the situation of perfect equal 
distribution. The Lorenz Curve is a charted representation of the quantitative 
relationship between the percentage of income recipients and the percentage of total 
income they received during a certain period of time. The more distant is the curve from 
the perfect equality (45º degree) line, the more unequal is a given economy. The Gini 
Index measures the distance between the actual distribution of income (Lorenz Curve) 
and the line of perfect equality. Thus, the lower (higher) the Gini Coefficient, the more 
(less) equally distributed income is (see e.g. Gastwirth, 1972).  
Since the World Bank database lacked some crucial data, namely for European 
countries, we first gathered information from the Eurostat for the European countries 
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and covered all the remainders using data from the World Bank database. This last data 
source only provided data from 1995 and did not cover all the years for every country. 
In order to overcome this gap, we defined as a criterion to keep sets that covered at least 
2/3 of the years between 1995 and 2009. Thereby, our sample uses Eurostat estimates 
for Gini Coefficient regarding the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and United Kingdom, and World Bank 
estimates for the reminders.  
It is important to note that Eurostat estimates for Gini Coefficient refer to 
equalised disposable income for households, meaning that income is weighted 
depending on the number and age of individuals that are members of a household.  
 
• INCOME LEVEL 
 Since the literature review we have developed clearly shows that most related 
studies focus on developing countries, we will implement causality tests considering 
three samples: (i) all data available; (ii) high-income countries and (iii) low-income 
countries.  
 To divide the countries by income level, we follow the categorization proposed 
by the World Bank: lower, lower middle, upper middle and higher income levels based 
on GNI (Gross National Income) per capita, converted in USD through the Atlas 
method. The thresholds are updated every year the 1st July along with the classification 
of the countries by income level. This means, that at present time, we know both the 
threshold for the year 2014 and the countries classification.  
 
 Table 5. World Bank Analytical Classifications  
GNI per capita in USD 2009 2014 
Lower Income (L) <= 995 <=1.045 
Lower Middle Income (LM) 996-3.945 1.046-4.125 
Upper Middle Income (UM) 3.946-12.195 4.126-12.735 
High Income >12.195 >12.735 
Source: World Bank Historical Analytical Classifications (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-
lending-groups, 18/08/2015). 
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However, since our data only covers up to 2009, we will consider the thresholds 
for that year. We also compare the groups of countries that emerge by computing the 
average values of GNI per capita for the time period 1995-2009 and the groups 
associated with the categorization made by the World Bank. 
 
 Figure 5. Number of countries in our sample by income class: World Bank Classification vs. average 
 values 
 
Source: Authors own calculations. 
 
 The figure shows that when categorizing the countries with GNI per capita 
averages during 1995-2009, there are more lower-middle class countries and less upper-
middle class. This difference results from the fact that emerging and transition countries 
like Belarus, Bulgaria, Dominican Republic, Peru and Romania have been upgrading 
their status over the years. We will maintain the categorization using the averages and 
the 2009 threshold since it is more adequate to consider all the relevant information 
regarding the evolution of the economies during these years. Therefore, our 
categorization is as follows: 
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 Table 6. Countries by income level using averages for the time period 1995-2009 and the World Bank 
 2009 threshold for GNI per capita in USD 
Lower Income Lower Middle Upper Middle Higher Income 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Moldova 
Armenia 
Belarus 
Bolivia 
Bulgaria 
Colombia 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Georgia 
Honduras 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Romania 
Ukraine 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Costa Rica 
Estonia 
Lithuania 
Panama 
Poland 
Russian Federation 
Uruguay 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
 
 The countries that we will consider as lower income are those listed as low 
income and lower middle, and the countries considered as higher income are the ones 
listed as upper middle and high income. 
Alternatively, we will test for countries that present NOE estimates higher and 
lower than 40% which, a priori, correspond to low-income countries and high-income 
countries, respectively. Indeed developed (developing) countries are characterized by 
low (high) NOE indicators in the literature. 
 
• TAX EVASION 
 The effect of taxes on income distribution and on the size of NOE is one of the 
recurrent mechanisms covered in the literature. In fact, numerous authors emphasized 
the argument that increasing taxes is a stimulus for increasing non-observed activities, 
namely through tax evasion. Other authors mention an ambiguous effect, which 
emerges because higher taxes also mean that citizens are contributing for a greater 
quality of public service and institutions. Hence, the income redistributive function of 
the state is associated not only to lower income inequalities but also to higher quality of 
public institutions, which may prevent informal activities from increasing. 
 We will also test for causality nexus using tax evasion estimates of Buehn and 
Schneider (2012b) for 19 OECD countries, during the years 1999 up to 2010. Their tax 
evasion estimates focus on legal activities, but illegally hidden, leaving aside criminal 
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activities. The tests will, firstly, assess whether it is tax evasion that fosters income 
inequality and, secondly, if it is income inequality that causes tax evasion. These data 
also contain estimations covering tax evasion associated with self-employment, since 
the authors found that self-employment is also a determinant of tax evasion. Self-
employment may significantly account for income that derives from unreported 
activities. Buehn and Schneider (2012b) mention that this type of non-observed activity 
is one of the main contributors to NOE, additionally stating that it is less controllable by 
the government and is ambiguous from a welfare point of view. In fact, self-
employment may act as an alternative source of income in some cases, therefore 
contributing for a greater overall welfare. The following figures represent the relation of 
tax evasion and tax evasion accounting for self-employment with the Gini Coefficient. 
The values are averages from 1999 up to 2010 for both variables.  
 The charts are able to illustrate the positive relation between the two, i.e., larger 
levels of tax evasion are positively correlated with Gini Coefficients, hence, with higher 
inequality (see Figures 6). In fact, the trend line obtained through the regression 
between Gini Coefficient and tax evasion has a smaller slope than the second which 
considers tax evasion that also accounts for self-employment. In fact, this chart may 
give primary evidence that tax evasion will not affect income inequalities or vice versa, 
since, at this point we do not know the direction of the causal nexus between 
inequalities and NOE or forms of NOE. Figure 6.2. shows a much greater slope which 
may lead to the conclusion that independent from the causal direction, this relation will 
more significant. 
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 Figure 6.1. and 6.2. Relation between tax evasion and Gini Coefficient, average 1999-2010 
 
 
 
Source: Authors own calculations using data from the World Bank and Buehn and Schneider (2012b). 
 
 Buehn and Schneider (2012b) offer estimates for tax evasion considering 38 
countries, which are not the same that compose the sample we have previously 
considered. Therefore, in order to account for the causality nexus between tax evasion 
and income inequalities, we will make the match between the available data with our 
previous panel for Gini Coefficient estimates and build a new panel. This new panel 
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consists of 19 countries, for the time period 1999-2010 (Table 7). According to our 
previous categorization of countries by income, most of the countries in this new panel 
belong to the higher income group – which was expectable since the data only 
contained OECD countries – only Bulgaria is considered as a lower income country. 
Thus, for this specific case testing for different income groups does not apply. This 
leaves us with two panels: the first for the overall analysis which includes Gini 
Coefficients and NOE estimates of Elgin and Oztunali (2012) forming a sample of 40 
(developed and developing) countries between 1995 and 2009; and a second panel build 
with estimations for tax evasion and tax evasion that accounts for self-employment of 
Buehn and Schneider (2012b) and Gini Coefficients form World Bank and Eurostat, a 
panel with data for 19 developed countries between 1999 and 2010. 
 
 Table 7. Countries included in the tax evasion panel data by income level  
Lower Middle Upper Middle High Income 
Bulgaria Estonia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Romania 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
 
4.2. Causality Tests – Analysis of results 
 
 Our empirical tests and results are divided as follows: first, we will run Granger 
Causality tests considering all data available (40 countries, 1995-2009). The second 
group of tests is applied to subsamples of high-income countries and of countries that 
present NOE estimations below 40% of GDP (developed countries). The income 
classification follow the World Bank’s criteria; the threshold of 40% for NOE was set 
looking at the data and verifying that, excepting for few countries, most of the high—
income countries exhibit NOE estimations below 40%. Conversely, the third group of 
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tests assesses the causal direction for low-income countries and for the subsample of 
countries that present estimated NOE above 40% of GDP.  
 The aim of the detailed assessment considering subsamples is to check whether 
the causal relation differs between more and less developed countries and infer if 
different types of NOE, typical of developed or developing countries, may explain such 
differences. 
 The late and fourth group of tests considers two forms of NOE– tax evasion 
(most important for developed countries) and tax evasion accounting for self-
employment (self-employment being most typical of developing countries). Tax evasion 
estimates include all potential volume of taxes in percent of GDP that were not 
collected by the governments; tax evasion accounting for self-employment considers the 
portion of tax evasion that also results from individuals being self-employed. To 
perform this test, we built another panel that gathers information for 19 countries, 
between 1999-2010, using Schneider and Enste (2012b) estimations.  
However, previous to conducting causality tests, we assessed the stationarity of 
the series NOE and GINI. A summary of panel unit root tests is shown in Annex II, for 
NOE and GINI and, in general, we can conclude for the stationarity of both series – we 
find evidence for unit root only in the case of the ADF-Fischer Chi-square test for the 
GINI.2 
 
 
 GRANGER CAUSALITY – FULL sample 
 When testing the causality nexus between NOE and Ineq considering the full 
baseline sample, the results from E-Views retrieve low p-values and high F-Stats, 
meaning that there is sustained evidence for causality in both directions (see Table 8). 
In fact, according to the tests, we reject both null hypotheses: H0 a) GINI does not 
Granger cause NOE and H0 b) NOE does not Granger cause GINI.  
 

Results are computed the full sample, and refer to the general measure of NOE.
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 Table 8. Granger Causality test results – NOE and GINI 
 
 A higher enough F-Stat allows rejecting the Null Hypothesis. In this case, we 
reject both hypotheses at 5% statistical significance, i.e., the level of income inequality 
does “Granger-cause” the size of NOE and, simultaneously, the size of the NOE does 
“Granger-cause” income inequality, thus supporting bilateral causality. However, we 
must note that the first hypothesis - GINI causing NOE - is significant at 1% 
significance level, while and the second hypothesis - NOE causing GINI - is rejected for 
2.5% and 1%. These results are in line with what the literature review suggested: 
income inequalities are more prone to cause NOE than the reverse (see, e.g., Chong and 
Gradstein, 2007; Rosser Jr. et al, 2003; Dessy and Pallage, 2003). 
 
 GRANGER CAUSALITY – DEVELOPED COUNTRIES subsample  
 If we consider only the group of high-income countries, the results are shown in 
the following table: 

3
 F-Stat: given the number of parameters and observations in this test, the degrees of freedom are (1, 
391); since the Granger Causality test does not require intercept, the first degree of freedom is simply the 
number of parameters (k=2) minus 1; the second value corresponds to the number of observations minus 
1.  F-Test threshold values differ for different levels of significance: e.g., 2.70 for 0.10, 3.84 for 0.05 and 
6.63 for 0.01 (source: http://www.socr.ucla.edu/applets.dir/f_table.html accessed 18/08/2015). 

 
Sample: 1995 2009  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE  396  40.7044 5.E-10 
 NOE does not Granger Cause GINI  4.01446 0.0458 
    
    

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 Table 9. Granger Causality test results – NOE estimates for higher income countries and GINI 
 
 For this group of countries, the direction of causality runs only from GINI to 
NOE. This means that, despite these countries usually having low estimated NOE and 
low estimated Gini Coefficients (low income inequality), the mechanisms operating 
from inequality to NOE (institutional quality, taxes and composition of aggregate 
demand) still seem to explain the link between these two variables. In fact, looking at 
the results, the probability of GINI not “Granger-causing” NOE is below 5%.  
 If we use as a criterion to classify countries the estimated NOE over GDP, and 
proceed with the test considering only countries with values of NOE below 40% of 
GDP, the results are shown in Table 10: 
 
 Table 10. Granger Causality test results – NOE estimates below 40% countries and GINI 
 
 The results are consistent with the previous test regarding the hypothesis of 
income inequalities causing NOE. Although, we also find, for a statistical significance 
of 5%, that NOE causes income inequalities for countries with values of NOE below 
40%. Although this hypothesis is less significant than the first (GINI “granger-causing” 
NOE), these results raise the following question: are lower sizes of non-observed 
economy more prone to be associated with economic distortions that increase income 
inequalities? Based on the literature review presented in Chapter 2, the main 
Sample: 1995 2009  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE_HIGHER  262  4.08086 0.0444 
 NOE_HIGHER does not Granger Cause GINI  0.59549 0.4410 
    
    

Sample: 1995 2009  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE_BELOW40  286  11.4720 0.0008 
 NOE_BELOW40 does not Granger Cause GINI  3.93862 0.0482 
    
    
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mechanisms that seem to operate in this direction are related with corruption and 
productivity. Since these countries already present a low dimension of the non-observed 
sector, increasing informal and underground activities seems to impact income 
distribution inequalities. In fact, it is easier to disturb an economy that has few non-
observed activities by increasing them, than disturbing an economy that works around a 
preeminent non-observed sector. In our literature we identified, first, productivity of 
informal firms as one of the main mechanisms operating from NOE to income 
inequalities (Mishra and Ray, 2010). Inherent to this element is the ability of firms to 
capture productivity premiums. Informal firms, which by not complying with 
regulations cannot benefit from public institution services, fail to seize premiums that 
derive from formality. These premiums may appear as efficiency gains, for example. 
Hence, more NOE, in this context, fosters income inequalities since firms are not as 
efficient as they would be, lowering their potential returns thus boosting inequalities. In 
countries with lower NOE, the fact that some firms act informally may create greater 
distortions than in an environment where there are already a large number of firms 
acting informally, hence already greater income inequalities. Second, corruption also 
acts as a vehicle from NOE to income inequalities (Mishra and Ray, 2010). In the same 
vein, corruption may cause greatest distortions towards income inequalities in countries 
where it has little expression – assuming corruption as a form of NOE – than in 
countries that already present higher corruption levels. Third, informal labour 
(Lukiyanova, 2015; Elia and Di Porto, 2011; Estevão and Filho, 2012) is also one of the 
recurrent mechanisms referred in this causal direction. Informal labour, are described in 
the literature as mostly low-skilled and prone to more unequal wage distribution among 
workers therefore causing income inequalities. In countries where there is a more 
equally distributed income, these factors reflected as NOE may in fact have greatest 
impacts in their income distribution than in economies where income inequality is 
already high. 
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 The following picture illustrates that, NOE has been decreasing overall, but the 
decrease has been stronger in countries with larger NOE estimations. Within our sample 
we find 29 countries with NOE below 40% and 11 above 40%. 
 
 Figure 7. NOE average estimates for countries with a NOE above and below 40% of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GRANGER CAUSALITY – DEVELOPING COUNTRIES subsample 
 Considering now the low-income countries subsample, we have gathered the 
results in Table 11 regarding the causality tests. 
 
 Table 11. Granger Causality test results – NOE estimates for low-income countries and GINI
 
 For this group of countries, it is clear that income inequalities cause the size of 
non-observed economy. The countries listed in this group, lower income countries, are 
Sample: 1995 2009  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE_LOWER  141  16.7301 7.E-05 
 NOE_LOWER does not Granger Cause GINI  0.01782 0.8940 
    
    

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mostly emerging countries or transition economies from our sample: Armenia, Belarus, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, 
Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Romania and Ukraine. On the subject of NOE and income 
inequalities, emerging and transition economies are the most studied group of countries, 
which allows us to identify the mechanisms relating the two variables. Most of these 
operate from income inequalities to non-observed economy, hence this result is in line 
with the expectations we have built based on the literature review. The most important 
mechanisms that we have identified in this direction were: taxes, quality of institutions 
and composition of the aggregate demand. For example, Dessy and Pallage (2007) 
stated that, for any increase in the tax rate, lower income classes have an incentive to go 
underground, informal or illegal. Hence, this effect tends to be more pronounced in 
poorer countries, reinforcing the evidence that, the more unequal economies are, the 
greater is the stimulus to increase the non-observed sector. Additionally, in poorer 
countries, governments are less able to enact policies as to improve the redistribution of 
income either through effective tax collection or by setting quality institutions capable 
of supervising efficiently economic activities; they are also unable to provide public 
services such as education and health facilities on a large scale basis. These distortions 
contribute, directly and indirectly, to increase income inequalities, and poorer 
individuals tend to seek alternative sources of income through informal and 
underground activities such as crime, self-consumption or working for informal firms, 
i.e., informal labour. 
 Following the above procedure, we also test the causality using now the 
subsample of countries with NOE values above or equal 40%, the results are the 
following: 
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 Table 12. Granger Causality test results – NOE estimates above 40% and GINI 
 
 Indeed, these results show that income inequalities cause NOE, which is 
consistent with our previous arguments and results controlling for low income 
countries. Regarding the conclusion we draw when testing for countries with NOE 
values below 40% - NOE may cause income inequalities - these results show that this 
does not hold in the case of developing countries. 4 
 Apparently, evidence that GINI causes NOE is rather robust across countries; the 
reverse causation does not clearly apply in the case of developing countries, but there is 
evidence of NOE causing GINI when NOE estimates are low (below 40% of GDP). 
 
GRANGER CAUSALITY – Detailed analysis: TAX EVASION 
 When testing for the causality nexus using tax evasion as a reference for NOE, 
we perform the tests for all the available data. The database is now different and, as 
referred before, the group of countries included covers only high-income ones. Non-
observed economy can take the form, for example, of non-legal transactions, crime, 
informal or underground productivity and tax evasion. Hence, to understand the 
complexity of the relationship between NOE and income inequality we first, perform 

When testing for the NOE threshold of 20% (considering values above or equal to 20% and below20%) 
we found that GINI causing NOE is the only statistically relevant hypothesis. This suggest that only a few 
number of countries that account for NOE estimates above 20% but below 40% are susceptible of 
presenting statistical relevance for the hypothesis of NOE causing GINI. The countries considered in the 
sample to have estimates below 20% are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. Countries that present estimates 
between 20% and 40% are the following: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia and Spain. 

Sample: 1995 2009  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE_ABOVE40  108  14.2269 0.0003 
 NOE_ABOVE40 does not Granger Cause GINI  1.80289 0.1823 
    
    

51 

the test for the causality between tax evasion and Gini Coefficient to understand if the 
causality nexus varies depending on the type of non-observed activities. 
 
 Table 13. Granger Causality test results – tax evasion and GINI 
 
 The results on Table 13 suggest that tax evasion can explain the causality from 
NOE to income inequality found in the previous results for developed countries. 
However, the literature and most of the research, when referring to taxes, mentioned its 
ability to operate from income inequality to non-observed economy (e.g., Dessy and 
Pallage, 2003). Despite this fact, these results allow discussion about the direction of the 
causal nexus varying depending on the different types of activities enclosed in NOE. In 
this case, tax evasion causes income inequalities at 5% statistical significance. We can, 
nonetheless, put forward some mechanisms that may explain this causality nexus. First, 
higher tax evasion reduces significantly public budget revenues. Thus less tax revenue 
constrains the redistribution of wealth and income by the government. The literature 
often suggested the ambiguous effect of taxes on income inequalities (Dessy and 
Pallage, 2003). On the one hand, higher taxes may lead individuals to perform non-
observed activities as a way to increase their income and evade taxation. Hence, by 
avoiding taxation, governments loose important revenues which could be targeted to the 
redistribution of income among citizens. On the other hand, higher taxes may contribute 
through the same way to a more equal distribution of income. Underlying these 
mechanisms, there seems to be an important vehicle transmitting the effects. We argue, 
based on the literature (e.g., Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Rosser Jr. et al., 2003), that 
this intermediate vehicle corresponds to the quality of institutions. Most of the countries 
of the sample are developed economies. This leads to the second consideration: looking 
at our sample of 19 countries, all a part of OECD and most of them being high-income 
countries, the possibility of NOE, in this context represented as tax evasion, causing 
Sample: 1999 2010  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 TAX_EVASION does not Granger Cause GINI  169  5.07560 0.0256 
 GINI does not Granger Cause TAX_EVASION  0.00899 0.9246 
    
    

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income inequalities, is a result in line with the precedent findings in this section (see 
section  developed countries, above). Higher income countries are more prone to verify 
the hypothesis of NOE causing income inequality. In this case, tax evasion is an 
important “vehicle” of transmission of this causal relation. We conjecture that a good 
set of institutions, working towards effectively controlling inequality, may be severely 
affected by tax evasion on their financing. In this group of countries, institutions and 
governments play an important role and perform better their functions. Hence, for these 
countries, tax evasion may be devastating to the functioning of the economy creating 
such distortions that it enhances income inequalities Due to lack of data for lower 
income countries, we are unable to verify the veracity of this premise and compare the 
different results. Ambiguous causality relation between taxes (or tax evasion) can, 
indeed, be related to the state of development of countries. For instance, Chong and 
Gradstein (2007) argue that developed countries present lower sizes of NOE and tend to 
have more institutional quality and less unequal income distribution. Additionally, our 
results for values of NOE below the threshold of 40% of GDP also indicate that the 
hypothesis of (general) NOE “granger-cause” income inequalities is statistically 
significant. Thus, in countries where non-observed activities are less relevant, its 
existence or growth may have more impacts on income inequality than in countries 
where NOE is far more important (above the threshold of 40%). Assuming a negative 
impact of NOE on GINI, both results lead us to believe that increasing NOE is more 
harmful to inequality in developed rather than in developing countries.  
 Moreover, the causality relation running from GINI to NOE found before 
(developed countries) does not, apparently, hold for the case of tax evasion alone. 
Apparently, the reverse causal direction (from income inequalities to general NOE) may 
be explained by other types of activities in the NOE. Another potential explanation may 
be related to the fact that most of the countries presented in the current sample are 
developed economies, hence presenting more equally distributed income and greater 
quality of institutions that may help preventing tax evasion.  
 
 In the following tests, the selected NOE measure adds self-employment to the 
tax evasion estimates. The results are as follows: 
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 Table 14. Granger Causality test results – tax evasion accounting for self-employment and GINI 
 The result of NOE causing GINI using tax evasion that also accounts for self-
employment as a proxy for NOE is statistically more significant than that obtained 
considering only tax evasion as a proxy for NOE. We may understand these results 
through the lens of our literature review concerning informal labour. Elia and Di Porto 
(2011), for example, in a study for Italy covering 2000 to 2005, state that informal 
labour includes mostly low-skilled whose earnings are significantly lower than that of 
formal workers. Since self-employment may be extensively related to self-consumption 
activities, it is fair to assume that they are also, to a considerable extent, low-skilled 
with lower earnings. In fact, lower (declared) earnings associated with self-employment 
may reflect more income inequalities. Moreover, Lukiyanova (2015) also enhances the 
difference of hourly wages in formal and informal labour. Wages of informal workers 
are more prone to polarization, hence are more unequally distributed. 
 
 GRANGER CAUSALITY – Detailed analysis: SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
 Isolating self-employment from the estimates of Buehn and Schneider (2012b) 
the results still hold to the hypothesis of forms of NOE causing inequalities and not 
verifying the reverse causal relation.  
 
Sample: 1999 2010  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 TAX_EVASION_SELF does not Granger Cause GINI  169  7.14237 0.0083 
 GINI does not Granger Cause TAX_EVASION_SELF  9.7E-05 0.9921 
    
    

54 

 Table 15. Granger Causality test results – self-employment and GINI 
 
4.3. Details on the nature of the causal relationship between NOE and GINI – 
A 2SLS approach 
 
 In order to better investigate the causal relationship between NOE and GINI, we 
implement a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach. This method complements our 
previous findings since the causality test determined that inequalities do indeed impact 
on NOE, and also that NOE may influence the levels of income inequality in higher 
income countries. Hence, these results imply a simultaneous-equation since there is a 
two simultaneous causal relationship to consider. The method of the 2SLS is one of the 
approaches used in simultaneous-equation problems. 
 At the present stage, we do not know the neither the magnitude nor the direction 
of the impacts between these two variables. So, in order to define the 2SLS model, we 
just rely on the available literature. The 2SLS method will allow us to quantify the 
effects in two stages, which involves two successive OLS regressions (Gujarati, 2009). 
The first stage of this method corresponds to estimate GINI or NOE through 
instrumental variables, where GINI or NOE are the dependent variables, but also 
appearing, interchangeably, as explanatory variables (see equations 4.3 and 4.4). 
Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that we are testing the influence of GINI on NOE 
(equation 4.3) and we know that both are mutually dependent or endogenous variables 
and thus NOE is surely correlated with the stochastic disturbance terms. As this two-
stage procedure indicates, the basic idea behind 2SLS is to “purify” the stochastic 
explanatory variable GINI by performing the reduced-form regression of GINI on all the 
predetermined variables in the system (Stage 1), obtaining the estimates, INˆGI , and 
replacing the latter in the original equation; then apply OLS to the equation thus 
Sample: 1999 2010  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 SELF_EMPL does not Granger Cause GINI  169  4.81731 0.0296 
 GINI does not Granger Cause SELF_EMPL  0.04791 0.8270 
    
    
    

55 

transformed (Stage 2). The estimators thus obtained are consistent; that is, they 
converge to their true values as the sample size increases indefinitely (Gujarati, 2009). 
 For this analysis, the equation that identifies NOE as a dependent variable (4.3) 
is an adaptation from the regression used by Chong and Gradstein (2007). This study 
provided strong evidence of income inequalities being a determinant of the size of 
NOE, along with labour rigidities and institutional quality. Taking the original equation 
from Chong and Gradstein (2007), we remove labour rigidities as an explanatory 
variable since we were unable to find adequate data, and replaced the variable by taxes 
in terms of GDP. Using this variable is coherent with the literature since taxes were 
invoked by Schneider and Enste (2000), along with social transfers paid by households, 
as the main causes for an increasing NOE. The variable taxes is defined as the 
percentage of total taxes on gross domestic product (tax burden), data provided by the 
World Bank.5 We kept the other explanatory variables used in Chong and Gradstein 
(2007): institutional quality, inst, and income inequality, GINI. Institutional quality is 
represented by the rule of law from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, a measure 
that intents to represent the confidence of individuals in society rules, contract 
enforcement, property rights public institutions as police and courts.6 Finally, as 
previously done, we use the Gini Coefficient to represent income inequality.  
 The regression used to estimate GINI is based on Portela (2013), a recent study 
on the macroeconomic determinants of income inequality. Selected dependent variables 
to explain GINI are: real GDP per capita (GDPpc), real GDP per capita squared 
(GDPpc2), unemployment (Unemp), inflation (Inflation) and credit constraints (Credit) - 
reflected by domestic credit to private sector by banks % GDP. Data come from the 
World Bank – World Development Indicators.  
 
(4.3)                
 
(4.4)   !  "#$%  &"#$%  '()*$ +
)*$,  -./0  1234   
 

5
 Data provided at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx accessed (21/09/2015). 
Data provided at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home accessed (21/09/2015).
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 In order to estimate the two equations above, we build another panel containing 
data for 22 developed countries7, from 1998 up to 2009. 
 From the related literature, we expect the application of the 2SLS method to find 
(i) a positive causality nexus from NOE to GINI and from GINI to NOE; (ii) a positive 
sign for the impact of taxes on NOE and, finally, (iii) a negative sign for the influence 
of institutional quality on NOE, meaning that increasing institutional quality should 
decrease NOE. Regarding income inequality we expect (i) a negative sign for the impact 
of GDP per capita and of GDP per capita squared; (ii) a positive impact of 
unemployment on inequality and (iii) a positive sign for the credit facilities.  
 In the following table we present the estimation results. 
 
 Table 16. Two-Stage Least Squares results – NOE as dependent variable 

 As table 16 reports, we found evidence for the positive causal nexus between 

7
 Countries of 2SLS panel data: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009     
Periods included: 9     
Cross-sections included: 22     
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 154   
Instrument specification: C RULE_LAW GDP_PERCAPITA 
        GDP_PERCAPITA2 INFLATION CREDIT UNEMPLOYMENT 
        -UNEMPLOYMENT(-1) TAXES01   
          
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
          
C 29.80196 1.170864 25.45297 0.0000 
GINI 0.003513 0.001023 3.435461 0.0008 
RULE_LAW -9.286810 0.538171 -17.25625 0.0000 
TAXES01 0.058831 0.041956 1.402197 0.1629 
          
          
R-squared 0.687094    Mean dependent var 21.01864 
Adjusted R-squared 0.680836    S.D. dependent var 7.144327 
S.E. of regression 4.036161    Sum squared resid 2443.590 
F-statistic 208.5054    Durbin-Watson stat 0.069742 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    Second-Stage SSR 1510.478 
Instrument rank 8       
          
    

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NOE and GINI, since the GINI’s coefficient is positive: although the associated estimate 
is close to 0, it is nonetheless statistically significant at 5%. This result corroborates our 
expectations and is explained by one of the recurring mechanisms identified by our 
literature review: the more unequal are income distributions among countries (at least 
concerning declared incomes used in the estimation of the Gini Coefficient), the more 
stimulus there are for poorer individuals to become a part of the non-observed economy. 
We note, however, that this sample is composed mostly by developed economies that, 
according to our previous findings (see section 4.2), present mixed results in what 
regards the causality GINI-NOE. Indeed, results showed that GINI causes NOE, and 
NOE causes GINI (for the sample of countries with NOE below the threshold of 40%).  
Concerning taxes, we found that, although with the expected sign, the variable is 
not statistically significant. This is not the result that we expected, since in earlier 
literature (see Schneider, 2005) taxes have been identified as one of the main 
contributors to increasing non-observed activity. However, we must also recall the 
study by Dessy and Pallage (2003), which advocates the ambiguous effect of taxes on 
the non-observed economy (further explained in chapter 3 above). Moreover, taxes 
may, in fact, reduce non-observed sector if the revenues are allocated to public 
institutions and in turn being able to enhance welfare and to provide infrastructures that 
enhance formality premiums captured by firms once they act on the formal economy 
(see Mishra and Ray, 2010; Dessy and Pallage, 2003). Additionally, a larger tax burden 
may also be correlated with lager transfers and public services that, by increasing 
money income or access to several services, reduce the incentives of the low-income 
households to deviate towards NOE. These effects may balance those related to the 
willingness for tax evasion the higher tax burden is. 
The hypothesis of institutional quality as an important determinant of NOE is 
corroborated by our results and in line with our expectations: its estimate coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant. This leads to the conclusion, as the related 
literature has been mentioning (e.g., Chong and Gradstein, 2007; Dessy and Pallage, 
2003), that the quality of institutions plays an important role in preventing increases of 
the non-observed economy. 
Concerning the estimated results when GINI is the dependent variable (see 
Table 17, below), NOE negatively affects GINI with a negative coefficient of 67.6, 
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statistically significant at 0.56%. This allows us to conclude that, when observing the 
reverse causal relationship (NOE causing income inequalities), the direction of the 
causality is negative, meaning that increasing non-observed economy reduces 
inequalities. This result may be explained by the nature of the variables: the Gini 
coefficient is based on declared incomes; hence, it does not include incomes that come 
from informal or underground activities. Our hypothesis on this is the following: on the 
one hand, a stronger law enforcement means fewer incentives to become part of the 
non-observed sector, resulting on more declared income, which can mean more unequal 
distribution patterns since, more often, it is the lower-class individuals that seek for 
other sources of revenues in the non-observed sector; on the other hand, the lower is law 
enforcement, the greater is tax evasion and official income can be “officially” more 
equally distributed. Following this rational, more observed economy can in fact lead to 
lower income inequalities. Furthermore, our results show evidence that increasing GDP 
per capita and credit constraints decrease income inequality, and that inequality 
increases as the unemployment rate accelerates. These results are in line with Portela 
(2013) findings and with most of the related literature therein. In fact, decreasing 
income inequality along with increasing GDP per capita corroborates the Kuznet’s 
hypothesis, as long as countries exhibit a sufficiently high record of GDP per capita. 
Furthermore, larger credit constraints are found to negatively impact on income 
inequality (cfr. Portela, 2013). Moreover, increasing unemployment is likely to increase 
inequality since it is a variable that captures the most the effects of economic cycles, 
meaning that in expansionary periods (where unemployment rates usually fall), 
inequality and unemployment decrease, behaving inversely during recessions. In our 
estimations, inflation is not statistically significant, probably due to the fact that 
inflation in the countries of our sample is rather stable and low, hence not being a 
relevant explanatory variable for explaining GINI. 
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 Table 17. Two-Stage Least Squares results – GINI as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample (adjusted): 2000 2009     
Periods included: 9     
Cross-sections included: 22     
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 154   
Instrument specification: C RULE_LAW GDP_PERCAPITA 
        GDP_PERCAPITA2 UNEMPLOYMENT-UNEMPLOYMENT(-1) CREDIT 
        TAXES01 INFLATION     
          
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
          
          
C 2953.738 793.9920 3.720111 0.0003 
NOE -67.61678 24.02811 -2.814070 0.0056 
GDP_PERCAPITA -0.036792 0.013945 -2.638469 0.0092 
GDP_PERCAPITA2 1.77E-07 1.06E-07 1.670502 0.0969 
UNEMPLOYMENT-UNEMPLOYMENT(-1) 90.99030 43.28027 2.102351 0.0372 
CREDIT -4.940656 1.679356 -2.941994 0.0038 
INFLATION 21.47777 22.63720 0.948782 0.3443 
          
          
R-squared 0.158090    Mean dependent var 269.6220 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123726    S.D. dependent var 737.0358 
S.E. of regression 689.9355    Sum squared resid 69973607 
F-statistic 6.159760    Durbin-Watson stat 0.157667 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000009    Second-Stage SSR 66414955 
Instrument rank 8       
          

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5. Conclusions 
 
 The literature has already built some clues on the possible relationship between 
NOE and income inequality, mostly enhancing that larger NOE estimates usually go 
along with higher income inequality. However, there is not a clear overview of the 
mechanisms relating both variables as well as on the nature and the sign of their causal 
relation. The aim of our work is to give an overall review on this subject and to answer 
the following questions: (i) what are the main mechanisms relating inequality and the 
size of non-observed economy?; (ii) what is the dominant causality relation – from 
inequality to non-observed economy or the other way around?; and finally (iii) what is 
the direction of the relationship: are the variables moving along in co-movement or are 
they inversely related?
Using Granger Causality tests, we contribute to the findings already present in 
the related literature, through categorizing results by country types. Using a panel data 
covering 40 countries from 1995 until 2009, we were able to assess that: (i) for the full 
sample there is a statistically significant bi-directional causal nexus between NOE and 
income inequality. However, causality running from income inequality to NOE was 
much more significant than the corresponding reverse causality; (ii) for the subsamples 
of developed and developing countries, we also found evidence for income inequality 
causing NOE and, when testing for countries presenting NOE estimates below the 
threshold of 40%, we also found that NOE causes income inequality. Since this 
evidence was not observed when testing for the subsample containing data for 
developing economies and countries with NOE estimates above 40%, an important 
question emerges, which we leave here for future investigation: is a lower dimension of 
NOE more prone to be associated with economic distortions able to increase income 
inequalities?  
Additionally, using a different panel consisting of 19 OECD countries with data 
covering the years of 1999 until 2010, we also tested for the causal nexus between 
income inequality and two forms of NOE: tax evasion and self-employment. The results 
were unequivocal: these forms of NOE are causing income inequality, and not the other 
way around. We conjecture that the remaining forms of NOE, such as informal labour 
and production, crime and other underground activities, are the ones caused by income 
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inequality. In summary, we found more robust evidence that causality runs from income 
inequality to NOE. 
 Finally, to fully encompass the relationship between NOE and income 
inequality, we implemented a 2SLS method, using a different panel (22 developed 
countries and covering annual data from 1998 to 2009), to better explain the 
relationship between these two variables. Our results suggest that, when income 
inequalities are causing the non-observed economy, both variables move in the same 
direction (positive coefficient). However, the reverse causal relation (NOE causing 
inequalities) suggested that the non-observed economy and income inequalities move 
inversely (negative coefficient). Moreover, our findings corroborate the hypothesis that 
taxes have an ambiguous effect on NOE since they are not statistically significant; 
institutional quality appears as an important explanatory variable of NOE, exhibiting a 
negative and statistically significant impact. Concerning the exogenous determinants of 
income inequality, we conclude that GDP per capita and credit facilities promote a 
more equally distributed income. 
 This work, however, entails some fragilities. In fact, the data gathered to apply 
Granger Causality tests using different types of NOE (tax evasion and self-employment) 
was not fully encompassing since we only considered developed OECD countries and 
thus did not allowed us to categorize the results by country of different development 
groups. Moreover, several forms of NOE were left out of this analysis. This was a 
limitation that we also found when building the panel for the 2SLS approach which 
considered only developed countries. 
 Another limitation that requires caution in interpreting our results is that the 
inequality measure is rather narrow. In fact, the GINI coefficient refers to inequality in 
reported disposable income. Thus we are unable to assess if NOE effectively reduces 
income (both reported and unreported) inequality. Moreover, other measures of 
inequality, such as consumption (encompassing private and public utility services) 
inequality, would be more adequate and results may surely change. 
Bearing these drawbacks in mind, we propose some suggestions to be addressed 
in further work. First, similar tests should be applied to larger panels – more country 
and time span inclusive – in order to assess differences between developed and 
developing countries. We found that NOE and income inequality have different causal 
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nexus according to the level development of the country. Thus the development level 
may be relevant to control for as it may change either the causality nexus between 
different types of NOE and inequality measures, and the magnitude and sign of the 
relationship. 
Second, and in order to better understand the nature of the relationship between 
NOE and inequality, we suggest to use data on more detailed forms of NOE (crime, 
informal labour, corruption, etc) and of inequality (e.g., consumption inequality). 
Finally, and since countries with NOE below 40% appear to provide statistical 
significant evidence supporting the hypothesis of NOE causing income inequality, we 
find the next question relevant for future research: is NOE more likely to cause larger 
distortions that may crucially affect by more income inequality in developed rather than 
in developing economies? 
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Annexes 
I. Causality tests results for countries presenting NOE above and below 
20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample: 1995 2009   
Lags: 1    
     
     
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
 NOE_ABOVE20 does not Granger Cause GINI  280  1.59779 0.2073  
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE_ABOVE20  29.9511 1.E-07  
     
     

Sample: 1995 2009  
Lags: 1   
    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
    
 NOE_BELOW20 does not Granger Cause GINI  117  1.12464 0.2912 
 GINI does not Granger Cause NOE_BELOW20  10.8942 0.0013 
    
    

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II. Stationary test for NOE and GINI 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  NOE    
Sample: 1995 2008   
Exogenous variables: None   
Automatic selection of maximum lags 
 
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -20.5453  0.0000  37  446 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  335.763  0.0000  37  446 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  454.683  0.0000  37  481 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  GINI   
Sample: 1995 2008   
Exogenous variables: None   
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.30562  0.0000  37  353 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  78.6496  0.3340  37  353 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  111.005  0.0035  37  362 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
